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I. DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK FOR
DISCUSSION
A. Introduction
The Civil Justice Reform Act ("CJRA") of 1990 required each
federal district court to develop a plan for civil case management to
reduce costs and delay.' To provide an empirical basis for assessing new
procedures adopted under the act, the legislation also provided for an
independent evaluation. Ten district courts, denoted "pilot" district
courts, were required to adopt plans that incorporated certain case
management principles through December 1995. The evaluation fo-
cused on the consequences of that pilot program.
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
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The Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts asked RAND's Institute for Civil Justice to evaluate the imple-
mentation and the effects of the CJRA in these districts. The RAND
reports on that main evaluation were completed in 1996. 2
After we completed our main CJRA evaluation, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States
("Committee") asked the RAND Institute for Civil Justice to conduct
further analyses of the CJRA evaluation data to see if additional light
could be shed on discovery management, to assist the Committee in
its consideration of possible changes in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure related to discovery. The Committee also asked the Federal
Judicial Center to conduct a major new survey of lawyers to gather
additional information about discovery.
This document contains RAND's further analyses of the CJRA
evaluation data, focusing on discovery management.
B. Overview of the CJRA
The CJRA created a pilot program that required ten federal dis-
trict courts to incorporate certain case management principles into
their plans and to consider incorporating certain other case manage-
ment techniques. The evaluation included ten other districts to permit
comparisons; these districts were not required to adopt any of the case
management principles or techniques.
The ten pilot districts selected by the Committee on Court Ad-
ministration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the
United States were California (S), Delaware and Georgia (N), New
York (S), Oklahoma (W), Pennsylvania (E), Tennessee (W), Texas (S),
and Utah and Wisconsin (E). The Judicial Conference, with advice
from RAND, also selected the following ten comparison districts: Ari-
zona and California (C), Florida (N), Illinois (N), Indiana (N), Ken-
tucky (E), Kentucky (W), Maryland and New York (E), and Pennsylva-
nia (M). Using several methods, we confirmed that the pilot and
2 The four reports that comprise that evaluation are:
JAMES S. KAKALIK CT AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE
MANAGEMENT UNDER ME CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (RAND, MR-800-1q) 1996),
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF TI/E CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND
COMPARISON DISTRICTS (RAND, MR--801-ICJ 1996) [hereinafter JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IM-
PLEMENTA'FION OF CJRA].
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER TIIE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT, (RAND, MR-802-ICJ 1996) [hereinafter main evaluation report).
JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION
UNDER TOE CIVIL JUSTICE. REFORM ACT (RAND, MR-805-ICJ 1996).
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comparison districts are comparable and adequately represent the
range of districts in the United States. Together, the twenty study
districts have about one-third of all federal judges and one-third of all
federal case filings.
1. The Six Case Management Principles
The CJRA directs each pilot district to incorporate the following
principles into its plan:
1. Differential case management;
2. Early judicial management;
3. Monitoring and control of complex cases;
4. Encouragement of cost-effective discovery through voluntary
exchanges and cooperative discovery devices;
5. Good-faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes before filing
motions; and
6. Referral of appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") programs.
Pilot districts must incorporate these principles, while other districts
may do so.
2. The Six Case Management Techniques
The CJRA directs each district to consider incorporating the fol-
lowing techniques into its plan, but no district is required to incorporate
them:
L Joint discovery/case management plan;
2. Party representation at each pretrial conference by an attorney
with authority to bind that party regarding all matters previously iden-
tified by the court for discussion at the conference;
3. Required signature of the attorney and the party on all requests
for discovery extensions or trial postponements;
4. Early neutral evaluation;
5. Party representatives with authority to bind to be present or
available by telephone at settlement conferences; and
6. Other features that the court considers appropriate.
C. Features of the RAND Evaluation
The main CJRA evaluation is designed to provide a quantitative
and qualitative basis for assessing how the case management principles
and techniques identified in the CJRA affect litigants' costs (measured
in both attorney work hours and money), time to disposition, partici-
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pants' satisfaction with the process, views of fairness of the process and
judge work time required.
Our main descriptive and statistical evaluation of how the CJRA
case management principles affected cost, time to disposition and
participants' satisfaction and views on fairness are presented in An
Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform
Act, RAND, MR-802—ICJ, by James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth,
Laura' A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace,
and Mary E. Vaiana, 1996 ("main evaluation report").
1. Data Sources
The evaluation is based on extensive and detailed case-level data
from January 1991 through December 1995. Data sources include:
• Court records;
• Records, reports, and surveys of CJRA advisory groups;
• The districts' cost and delay reduction plans;
• Detailed case processing and docket information on a sample
of cases;
• Surveys of judicial officers on their activities, time expenditures,
and views of CJRA;
• Mail surveys of attorneys and litigants about costs, time, satisfac-
tion, and views of the fairness of the process; and
• Interviews in person with judges, court staff, and lawyers in each
of the twenty districts.
We used CJRA advisory group reports, documents and meeting
minutes to assess the advisory group process and findings; we used the
districts' plans and proposed local rule changes to assess what the
district said it would do under CJRA; we used the dockets for a large
sample of cases to help us understand what was actually done on cases
and when (such as schedule setting, assignment to management tracks,
or referral to ADR); we used court records to assess the basic charac-
teristics of the cases and court actions, such as referral to ADR, that
were not always on the court docket; we used the judicial surveys on
our sample of cases to get judges' views on whether they had changed
how they manage cases as a result of CJRA; we used extensive mail
surveys of thousands of lawyers and litigants on our sample of cases to
get their views on how the case was managed and information on
litigation costs, satisfaction and views of fairness; and we used extensive
semi-structured interviews with judges, court staff, advisory group
members and lawyers to understand better both the implementation
of CJRA and case management in the districts before and after CJRA.
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In total, more than 10,000 cases were selected for intensive study
in the main evaluation report, half of which had closed before CJRA
and half of which had been filed in 1992-93, after the CJRA was passed.
This current document focuses on the sample of 5222 cases filed in
1992-93 after the CJRA was passed. For those 5222 cases, we received
survey responses from 67% of the judges (3280), from 47% of the
lawyers (4061 out of 9423 surveyed), and from 13% of the litigants
(2264 out of 20,272 surveyed). Because of the low litigant response
rate, we were limited in our ability to analyze litigants' hours spent,
satisfaction and views of fairness.
2. Analytic Approach
We use both descriptive tabulations and multivariate statistical
techniques to analyze time to disposition, costs and participants' satisfac-
tion and views of fairness.
We analyze time to disposition, rather than delay, because the
latter cannot be defined without reference to some currently unavail-
able standard of how long civil cases should take to resolve.
We present information on litigation cost in the main evaluation
report, measured in both monetary and work hour terms. 3 Our reports
provide data on monetary costs to litigants, litigant hours spent and
lawyer work hours spent. However, we consider lawyer work hours to
be the best available measure of how case management affects litiga-
tion costs because it has uniform meaning regardless of attorney fee
structure' or geographic variations in attorney fee rates and can be
used consistently for both in-house lawyers and outside counse1. 5 Con-
sequently, in the statistical analyses we use lawyer work hours as our
5 Our main evaluation report included information on total judge work minutes on cases.
We have not included the judge work minutes in the present analysis of discovery for two reasons:
(1) The portion of judge work minutes specific to discovery could not be reliably identified within
the total judge work minutes; and (2) more importantly, although most judges cooperated with
the study and provided their work minutes on each case, sonic judges did not, and this could
lead to biased statistical results because we strongly suspect that the choice by judges to cooperate
with the judge time study was correlated with the judge's attitude toward and use of case
management.
4 Under some fee structures, such as contingent fees, changes in lawyer work hours that may
result from changes in court management are not necessarily reflected in the fees charged to
clients.
5 Lawyer work hours do not explicitly capture the "out of pocket" costs of litigation such as
filing fees, travel, and investigator or expert witness fees, but those costs typically arc less than
10% of the total litigation costs. Costs associated with lawyers' work constitute the vast majority
of total transaction costs.
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measure of costs. We present information on both total lawyer work
hours and lawyer work hours on discovery, and those two measures are
highly correlated. We think, however, that the total is a better measure
than the lawyer hours spent on discovery because our interviews sug-
gest that some types of discovery management may reduce discovery
hours by shifting lawyer work to other types of activity (such as disclo-
sure as a substitute for some discovery, or an ADR session as a substitute
for some discovery). In addition, lawyers may differ in whether or not
they report a given type of work activity as discovery-related (such as
interviewing experts in direct preparation for trial).
We also note that, in addition to the cost of lawyers, the cost of
the time litigants and their staff spend can be substantial, and much
of that time is spent on discovery. Litigants must prepare for and give
depositions, search for documents and screen documents and comput-
erized files for privileged information, for example. This time is not
reflected in the lawyer work hours we analyze, although we did ask
litigants for the amount of time spent. Because of the low 13% re-
sponse rate from litigants, however, we are not comfortable that the
responses received are representative of all litigants. Hence, we do not
analyze litigant time spent on the cases.
We note that we are measuring time and cost objectively by using
time to disposition and lawyer work hours. Our main evaluation report,
and some other research studies, also asked for lawyers' subjective
opinions about whether time and cost increased or decreased when a
particular case management technique was used. It is important to
note that the objective and subjective data do not always agree, and we
believe that the objective data are more reliable measures of how policy
actually affects time to disposition and lawyer work hours. The subjec-
tive data are really measuring perceptions, which are different from
what the objective data measure. Also, subjective data from surveys in
general tend to have a "positivity bias."
Our assessment of satisfaction and views of fairness is subjective
and drawn from the results of our surveys. 6
In the main evaluation report, we based our assessment of case
management policies and procedures on data from general civil litiga-
°Satisfaction and views of fairness were measured by responses to the following questions:
How satisfied were you with the court management and procedures for this case for your party
or parties?; and, How fair do you think the court management and procedures were for this case
for your party or parties?
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Lion cases' with issue joined.8 We also analyzed the subset of these cases
that took longer than nine months to disposition. In this further
evaluation of the CJRA data focusing on discovery management, we
again focus on general civil litigation cases closed after issue is joined.
We also focus exclusively on the post-CJRA portion of the data, i.e.,
those cases filed in 1992-93, because the CJRA made substantial
changes in how discovery was managed in some districts. We also focus
predominantly in our further analyses on the 1624 cases that took
longer than nine months to disposition. About half the general civil
cases close after nine months, but they consume about three-fourths
of all lawyer work hours, and 80% of lawyer work hours spent on
discovery.
In this further evaluation of discovery and its management, our
methods of statistical analysis are the same as in the main evaluation
report, with three major exceptions: (1) we explicitly evaluate combi-
nations of various management policies (such as early management
used in combination with discovery plans and early scheduling of a
trial date, versus early management used without discovery plans and
without early scheduling of a trial date); (2) we explicitly and separately
analyze the data for various categories of cases or lawyers (such as
high-complexity cases only, high-stakes cases only, contingent fee law-
yers only, or tort cases only); and (3) in addition to our analysis of total
lawyer work hours, we also explicitly analyze lawyer work hours on
discovery.
D. Outline of This Document
This document is intended for policymakers and policy-users and
focuses on descriptive information about discovery, and on discovery
management policy evaluation.
The discussion is organized as follows. In the remainder of section
I we provide more background and a framework for the discovery
7 In practice, federal district courts split the civil caseload into two categories—those types
of cases that usually receive minimal or no management, and those general civil litigation cases
to which the district's standard case management policies and procedures apply (and which are
of primary concern for evaluation of CJRA case management principles and techniques). Minimal
management is usually applied to prisoner cases (other than death penalty cases), administrative
reviews of Social Security cases, bankruptcy appeals, foreclosure, forfeiture and penalty, and debt
recovery cases.
11
 Issue is considered joined after the defendants have answered the complaint in accordance
with Rule 12 (a) or as mandated otherwise by the court. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, VOLUME XI, STATISTICS MANUAL 15
(1995).
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discussion in the rest of this document. In section II we provide de-
scriptive information about discovery and other aspects of categories
of cases defined by level of complexity, level of discovery difficulty,
plaintiff or defendant side of the case, contingent or hourly fee lawyer,
size of the law organization in which the lawyer worked, case stakes,
tort or contract or other nature of suit categories, or the top 25% most
costly cases among general civil litigation that has time to disposition
over 270 days after filing. Section III contains our evaluation of various
discovery management policies, and section IV summarizes our policy
findings.
E. A Brief History of Empirical Research on Discovery and Its
Relationship to Litigation Costs and Delay
Despite the widespread belief that discovery is to blame for much
of the delay and costliness of civil case processing, there have been few
empirical data available on the magnitude of discovery, patterns of use
across case types, or direct or indirect costs associated with discovery
or various different discovery management policies. Nor has there
been much effort in the past to measure the effect of adopting differ-
ent discovery reforms or discovery management policies on time to
disposition or costs.
In one of the most extensive previous studies, researchers at the
Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") selected 3000 civil cases terminated in
1975 from six federal district courts and examined the extent and
pattern of discovery in those cases. The FJC researchers found substan-
tial variation in discovery among cases. Half had no discovery at all;
among the remainder, 20% averaged 1.7 requests per case; 60% aver-
aged 5 requests per case; and the remaining 20% averaged 17 requests
per case. The FJC concluded that:
[D]iscovery abuse, to the extent it exists, does not permeate
the vast majority of federal filings. In half the filings, there is
no discovery—abusive or otherwise. In the remaining half of
the filings, abuse—to the extent that it exists—must be found
in the quality of the discovery requests, not in the quantity,
since fewer than 5% of the filings involved more than ten
requests. 9
9
 PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTIL, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL
LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 35 (1978),
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The FJC found that the amount of discovery likely in a case could
be predicted based on knowing "[t.] he subject matter of a case, the
number of parties, the presence of counterclaims or cross claims, and,
to a lesser extent, the amount in controversy . ."'° They also found
significant differences across courts.
In the same study, the FJC also investigated the effects of limiting
elapsed time for discovery on time to disposition and amount of dis-
covery activity. They found that restricting the amount of time for dis-
covery reduced the overall time to disposition, but actually increased
the amount of discovery, perhaps because attorneys had less time to
consider carefully their discovery options.
In a subsequent empirical study of about 1600 cases in federal and
state courts, the Civil Litigation Research Project ("CLRP") also found
that "relatively little discovery occurs in the ordinary lawsuit. We found
no evidence of discovery in over half our cases. Rarely did the records
reveal more than five separate discovery events."" That same study
found that on average about 17% of lawyer time is devoted to discov-
ery. 12
More recently, in a study of California's Trial Court Delay Reduc-
tion Act, the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC") found that
courts that adopted procedures for managing pretrial activities, includ-
ing discovery, achieved significant reductions in case disposition
times.''
In the early 1990s, the NCSC conducted an empirical study of
discovery in about 2000 court cases in five state trial courts. Their
findings affirmed those of the earlier FJC and CLRP studies. The NCSC
found that 42% of general civil litigation cases did not have recorded
discovery, and that 37% of those with discovery had three or fewer
pieces of discovery."
Other empirical studies concerning discovery have measured sub-
jective attitudes, rather than objective case data. A 1986 study of attor-
neys' attitudes in twelve federal districts that had adopted local rules
limiting the number of interrogatories and requests for admissions
found that a majority approved of these rules. Support for such limits
did not vary by type of practice (size of firm, case specialization,
10 Id. at iv.
11 David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 90 (1983).
12 See id. at 91 tbl. 3.
13 See 1 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, PROMPT AND FAIR JUSTICE IN TIIE TRIAL COURTS
11-5 (1991) [hereinafter FAIR JUSTICE].
14 See Susan Keilitz et al., Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts out of Control?, ST. CT. J.,
Spring 1993, at 9.
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plaintiff versus defendant) or by degree of litigation experience. 15 A
study of federal and state judges conducted by Louis Harris and Asso-
ciates in 1987 found that 45% of federal judges surveyed, and 34% of
state judges, cited "abuse of the discovery process" as among the most
serious causes of civil case delay in their courts.i 6 One-third of the
federal and state judges said that there were "a lot of problems" with
the discovery process in their jurisdictions.''' When asked what ap-
proaches might best solve these problems, federal judges called for
changes in the informal practices of the bar and greater exercise of
judicial discretion, rather than further changes in the rules. State
judges' opinions on solutions were divided among the three options
(changing informal practices, greater use of judicial discretion and
rule changes) . 18
In 1997, the FJC conducted a major new survey of lawyers to
gather additional information about discovery, and those results are
also in this issue.' 9
While the majority of the civil cases have either no discovery or
limited discovery, a great deal of attention is paid to perceived discov-
ery problems in the literature and by judges and lawyers. These find-
ings are consistent with one another when we understand that the
perceived discovery problems can be substantial for the minority of the
cases in which they occur.
F. A Brief History of Discovery Reform
The modern history of discovery practice began with the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") in 1938. 20 A key
element of the philosophy behind those Rules was "notice" pleading
with facts of cases to be developed through discovery. The new Rules
expanded the scope of discovery and relaxed prior limitations on the
amount and timing of discovery. Although the Rules are often cited as
19 See JOHN SHAPARD & CARROLL SERON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEYS' VIEWS OF
LOCAL RULES LIMITING INTERROGATORIES v (1986). Based on the attorneys' self-reports of their
use of interrogatories in recent cases, the researchers also concluded that in most cases, activity
was not actually constrained by the rules, both because the limitations were set high enough so
as not to limit effectively the average case and because a significant fraction of attorneys either
ignored the rules or received formal waivers from the court. See id.
19 See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., JUDGES' OPINIONS ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES 37 (1987).
17 See id. at 39.
19 See id. at 40.
19 See Thomas E. Winging et al., Federal Judicial Ctr., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998).
! 1r For a fuller discussion of this period, see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed.'
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998).
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laying the basis for contemporary judicial control over the litigation
process, 21
 in practice they appear to have placed control over the
discovery process predominantly in the attorneys' hands. Indeed,
amendments in 1946 and 1970 further relaxed limitations on attor-
neys' discovery activities. 22
By the mid-1970s, however, confidence in attorneys' abilities to
manage discovery efficiently had begun to erode." After the 1976
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice (convened by Chief Justice Warren Burger
and known as the Pound Conference), and the issuance of a report
on discovery abuse by an American Bar Association ("ABA") Special
Committee that was established as a follow-up to the conference,"
support mounted for increasing judicial control over discovery. When
dissension within the bar diluted the force and scope of amendments
to the Rules that were adopted in 1980, a second set of stronger
amendments was adopted in 1983. The new amendments prohibited
redundant discovery, required that discovery be proportional to the
magnitude of the case and mandated court sanctions for violation of
the Rules. They also explicitly provided for judicial discussion of dis-
covery plans at pretrial conferences and for the judge's issuance of an
order scheduling discovery and other pretrial events. 25 In the following
years, many federal jurisdictions adopted local court rules limiting the
amount and timing of discovery.
Notwithstanding these rule changes, concern about discovery
abuse continued through the 1980s and contributed to the passage of
the CJRA of 1990. That Act, a product of a task force set up by Senator
Joseph Biden to consider options for reducing delay and costs associ-
ated with civil case processing, 26
 required each federal district court to
submit a plan for improving civil case management. The Act encour-
aged courts to consider changes in discovery, including limitations on
2t See CONNOLY ET AL., supra note 9, at 10.
22 See id. The 1970 amendments were intended in part to reduce judicial time spent on
managing civil litigation. See Sherman L. Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and
Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REY. 253, 254 (1979).
27 For a fuller discussion of this period, see Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux,
39 B.C. L. Ray. 747 (1998).
21 See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules,
30 VILL. L. Ray. 767, 778 (1985).
25 See id. at 782-93.
26 See T/IE BROOKINGS INST., jusTicE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITI-
GATION vii (1989) [hereinafter jusTtca FOR ALL].
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timing and amount of discovery and special programs to assist attor-
neys in better planning discovery activities.
In December 1993, partially in response to the CJRA, a number
of changes to the Rules were made. Those changes included a require-
ment that parties meet and prepare a proposed discovery plan before
a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due, a require-
ment for disclosure of certain basic relevant information without wait-
ing for a discovery request, discretionary sanctions for Rule 11 viola-
tions rather than mandatory sanctions, and a limitation on the number
of depositions and interrogatories. Districts were allowed to opt out of
some of these changes, in part to enable them to continue their CJRA
mandated cost and delay reduction plans unchanged.
By the late 1970s, many state court systems were experimenting
with limitations on discovery activity. In a survey conducted in 1981,
the RAND Institute for Civil Justice found that twenty-nine states and
twenty-three of the nation's largest metropolitan trial courts had
adopted one or more measures to expedite pretrial discovery, includ-
ing using mail and telephone to expedite pretrial motions processing,
requiring attorneys to attempt to settle their discovery disputes before
requesting judicial intervention, assigning parajudicial personnel to
hear discovery motions, limiting the number of interrogatories, limit-
ing the time allowed for discovery, holding conferences to schedule
discovery and authorizing sanctions for frivolous discovery motions."
For example, California, which had eliminated prior restrictions
on discovery in 1957, reinstated some limitations in the Civil Discovery
Act of 1986 ("CDA").28 The CDA restricts the number of special inter-
rogatories to thirty-five, the number of requests for admission to thirty-
five, and the number of depositions of any one witness to one. The
CDA defines discovery abuse and authorizes sanctions, including
monetary fines, for such abuse." In addition, under the Trial Court
Delay Reduction Act of 1986, some California courts experimented
with schedules for case disposition that mandated completion of dis-
covery by a specified number of days after case filing, and in other
courts, discovery schedules tailored to the specifics of individual cases
were set at judicial status conferences."
27 See PATRICIA A. EBENER ET AL„ RAND INST. FOR CIVILIUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE
PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY 30 (1981).
28 See. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AVERTING GRIDLOCK: STRATE-
GIES FOR REDUCING CIVIL DELAY IN THE Los ANGELL'S SUPERIOR COURT 89 (1990).
29 See CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2036 (West Supp. 1998).
" See FAIR JUSTICE, supra note 13, at III-3-4.
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G. Options for Reform
As a result of continuing concern about discovery abuse, many
federal and state courts now have in place some sort of limitations on
the extent, timing, or manner of discovery. Some federal district courts
adopted new procedures for managing discovery as part of their re-
quired plans for reducing civil case delay and expense under the CfRA.
In addition, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules is currently holding exploratory discussions to consider the
development of proposals for additional modifications to the Rules.
The major options for reform can be grouped into seven catego-
ries: (1) adopting standardized rules limiting the scope, amount, or
timing of discovery activity; (2) mandating early disclosure of key
information; (3) imposing monetary or other sanctions for violation
of court-enunciated practice standards; (4) assisting attorneys in more
efficient management of discovery; (5) cost and fee shifting; (6) closer
management of attorneys by clients; and (7) shifting responsibility for
conducting discovery to judges, as is common in some European sys-
tems. Below we discuss each of these in turn.
1. Standardized Rules Limiting the Scope, Amount, or Timing of
Discovery
As indicated by the discussion above, the most frequent response
to concern about discovery abuse has been the adoption of rules
limiting the amount or timing of discovery activity. Limitations on
timing appear to have the desired effect of reducing total time to
disposition, but severe restrictions on the elapsed time for pretrial
activities are frequently met with opposition from the bar. 3 ' Moreover,
limitations on elapsed time for discovery do not reduce necessarily the
magnitude of discovery activity and therefore may have little effect on
discovery costs. Whether imposing limitations on the amount of dis-
covery (e.g., number of interrogatories, number of requests for admis-
sion, number or length of depositions, or volume and nature of docu-
ment requests) has the desired effect of limiting the overall magnitude
of discovery activity is unclear. It may be that, to satisfy attorney con-
cerns about the need for extensive discovery in some cases, courts set
these limits so high as to have little effect on most cases. Our interviews
31
 In its report to the Legislature on the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, the judicial Council
noted: "Despite bar involvement in planning the programs in all counties and despite the support
of a majority of lawyers for judicial control of the pace of litigation, there is substantial discontent
among lawyers with the program's operation." Id. at 11-4.
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suggest that attorneys sometimes can evade these standards, either by
simply ignoring them, by obtaining judicial waivers, or by switching to
some other formal or informal method of discovery. Numerical limi-
tations also raise the question of how to define a single interrogatory,
deposition, or other request.
Courts may have more success in implementing numerical and
time limits when these are coordinated with differentiated case man-
agement ("DCM") plans, if those plans are fully implemented. Incor-
porating numerical limits on discovery activity into DCM plans may
also permit courts to specify more modest amounts of activity for
ordinary cases, while preserving higher limits for more complex cases.
A relatively new approach to limiting discovery activity is "phased
discovery," in which attorneys, on their own or with the court's assis-
tance, develop plans for sequencing discovery.s2 Sequencing may be by
subject matter, party, or type of evidence, and may be prescribed by a
broadly applicable rule or on a case-by-case basis. Phased discovery may
be linked to specific case milestones—for example, attorneys may be
permitted to conduct only a modest amount of discovery before an
early neutral evaluation or an early status conference is conducted. The
goal is to focus parties on those aspects of discovery that are most
helpful to evaluating the case as early in the litigation process as
possible, thereby contributing to settlement before high litigation costs
are incurred.
The discussion above focuses on attempting to control discovery
without changing the general scope of allowable discovery. However,
the scope of discovery itself is another major area for potential reform
to limit whatever discovery problems may exist. As recently as 1970, the
scope of discovery was expanded by rule change. Subsequent rule
changes have not narrowed the general scope of discovery, but the
American College of Trial Lawyers is currently recommending the
amendment of discovery Rule 26(b) (1) to narrow the scope and
breadth of civil discovery by changing the language from "any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party" to new
language: "any matter, not privileged which is relevant to the claim or
32 "Phased discovery" is suggested in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.42 (3d ed.
1995) and was advocated for a broad range of civil cases by Judge Robert Peckham of the
Northern District of California. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LITIGATION SECTION, REPORT
OF TILE TASK FORCE ON TIIE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 9-15 (1992); JusncE FOR ALL, Supra note
26, at 20-21.
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defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of
any other party . . "3
2. Mandatory Early Disclosure
CJRA brought about substantial change in early disclosure of
information without a formal discovery request. Only one district re-
quired it before CJRA;34 after CJRA, all pilot and comparison districts
in the RAND evaluation adopted one of five approaches providing
either voluntary or mandatory exchange of information by lawyers,
sometimes only for specified types of cases. Three pilot and two com-
parison districts adopted the voluntary exchange model, which encour-
ages lawyers to cooperate in exchanging information. Three pilot
districts and one comparison district followed a mandatory exchange
model for a limited subset of cases and a voluntary model on other
cases. Two pilot districts and one comparison district required lawyers
mandatorily to disclose certain information, including anything bear-
ing significantly on their sides' claims or defenses. Two other pilot
districts and one other comparison district have similar mandatory
requirements, but they apply it to all information bearing significantly
on both sides' claims or defenses.
After our sample cases were selected, four pilot districts switched
from their initial early disclosure procedures to follow the December
1993 revised Rule 26(a) (1), which requires the mandatory exchange
of information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleadings, plus information on damages and insurance. Six com-
parison districts also are following the revised Rule 26(a) (1). The ten
other pilot and comparison districts have decided to "opt out" and are
not following the revised Rule 26(a) (1). Some districts opted out to
retain their pilot program disclosure rules, some of which were more
stringent in their disclosure requirements than the revised Rule
26(a)(1). Because our sample cases were selected well before the
revised Rule 26(a) (1) went into effect, we could not use our data to
evaluate that revised rule.
33 AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, MONOGRAPH OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (1997). This proposal was presented to the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules by the American College of Trial Lawyers, Irvine, CA, at a
January 16, 1997 Advisory Committee meeting.
34 At least one other district required attorneys to confer before the first pretrial conference
to attempt to agree on a scheduling order.
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1 Sanctions
Increasingly, proposals for restrictions on discovery are accompa-
nied by calls for monetary or preclusionary sanctions against those who
violate the standards. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules
explicitly authorized sanctions, including attorney fees, for discovery
abuse, as did California's Civil Discovery Act of 1986. Empirical re-
search on sanctions suggests that courts and individual judges vary
considerably in their use of sanctions. 35 But courts may be becoming
more willing to impose sanctions as caseload pressure increases.
4. Providing Assistance with Discovery Planning
Courts also are increasingly becoming involved in assisting attor-
neys in planning discovery. The 1983 amendments to Rule 16 provided
for the inclusion of key discovery events in the judge's scheduling
order to be issued after the pretrial conference. In federal courts,
magistrate judges and special masters have assisted attorneys in man-
aging discovery in complex litigation. Most federal district courts re-
quire that attorneys make a good-faith effort to resolve discovery dis-
putes before filing motions. And the 1993 Rules' amendments
required that the parties meet and prepare a proposed discovery plan
before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due,
although individual districts could exempt some or all types of cases
from this requirement.
One relatively new alternative dispute resolution mechanism that
may have the added benefit of assisting attorneys in developing discov-
ery plans is mandatory early neutral evaluation ("ENE"). First adopted
in the Northern District of California, ENE was conceived by the bench
and bar at least in part to help attorneys identify the issues that are
central to their disputes, so that they could focus their pretrial efforts
on these issues. Under the Northern District's plan, an attorney volun-
teer ("neutral evaluator") meets with the attorneys and their clients
early in the litigation process to discuss the case. The neutral evaluator
then delivers his or her assessment of the case to each side, and this
ENE can include advice on discovery planning. We do not have suf-
311 The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 Amendments to Rule 26 cite this research as
a motivation for making judicial sanctioning authority explicit. But as late as 1988, the General
Accounting Office found substantial variation in the use of sanctions. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, FEDERAL COURTS: PRETRIAL MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL CASES VARIED AT SELECTED
DISTRICT COURTS 28-29 (1988).
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ficient data on cases that received ENE to evaluate its potential effect
on discovery.
It is important to note that court efforts to assist attorneys in
developing more efficient discovery plans are not cost free. Unless
increased judicial management time directed toward the pretrial proc-
ess translates into substantial savings at later pretrial or trial stages, the
net effect on court budgets could be an increase in costs borne by
taxpayers. If this were the case, public policymakers would have to
decide whether these increased costs are justified by cost savings and
other benefits to individual and corporate litigants. Alternatively, turn-
ing to attorney volunteers to assist in discovery management, as is
contemplated in most ENE programs, imposes an additional burden
on the bar.
5. Cost and Fee Shifting
Under the "American Rule," each side bears the costs of its own
litigation, including both the costs of initiating discovery of informa-
tion in its opponent's possession and the costs of responding to an
opponent's requests for information. Under certain circumstances, for
public policy reasons, legislatures have provided for "one-way" cost
shifting, permitting prevailing plaintiffs to recover legal fees from
defendants. Federal and state discovery rules have also provided for
limited shifting of discovery costs, in cases where the court finds that
a motion was frivolous or intended for an improper purpose, such as
to delay unnecessarily the proceedings or harass the opposing party.
Federal Rule 11 states that the court "may" impose sanctions on inap-
propriate behavior, by ordering the offending party to pay some or all
of the reasonable expenses incurred by the other side as a result of
this behavior, including attorney fees.
Although some of the options outlined above have proved contro-
versial, all involve modifications in existing court rules or procedures.
Two other options for reform require more extensive rethinking of the
civil litigation process: one, by rethinking, and perhaps restructuring,
the lawyer-client relationship; the other, by redefining the role of the
judge.
6. Closer Management of Attorneys by Parties
In response to rising legal costs, many large corporations have
begun restructuring their relationships with legal service providers.
Eighty percent of Fortune 1000 corporations surveyed by Louis Harris
and Associates ("Louis Harris") said that they have brought more of
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their legal work in-house in recent years. 36 Bringing work in-house
provides an opportunity for corporations to examine more closely the
costs and benefits of litigation strategies, including discovery. Almost
all of the corporate legal officers surveyed by Louis Harris (95%) said
they involve in-house counsel in planning strategy on major matters,
and 60% said that they require litigation budgets, including resources
allocated for discovery, to be submitted for major work. Almost all of
these corporations (98%) now require their outside counsel to submit
detailed bills." These changes in policies concerning corporate cli-
ent/outside counsel relationships have the potential to heighten cor-
porate parties' attention to the costs (and benefits) of alternative
discovery strategies. It may be more difficult for smaller corporations,
however, with fewer resources for managing their legal services, to
implement such policies.
Some critics of discovery allege that certain attorneys engage in
excessive discovery to run up their bills. Because corporate attorneys
typically are paid on an hours and expenses basis, it is often said that
they have an incentive to "keep their meters running." Some corpora-
tions are experimenting with alternative billing practices intended to
change these incentives. For example, some corporate legal officers
are requesting that outside counsel charge flat rates for certain cases
or for certain litigation activities ("menu billing"). Others are agreeing
to fees with contingency factors—sometimes called "premium bill-
ing".38 Because these alternative fee arrangements reduce dependence
on hourly billing, they should reduce the incentives of attorneys to
engage in discovery as a means of fee enhancement.
7. Judicial Discovery
The American civil litigation system relies on an adversarial proc-
ess to investigate (discover) and present the facts that are relevant to
resolving a dispute. Each side is assumed to have the incentives to bring
out those facts that would support its case. In principle, if the parties
have equal resources and equally skilled representatives, these incen-
tives should assure that all of the relevant facts are presented to the
fact finder. By excluding the judge from the investigatory process, the
American system also assures that final judgment on the case will be
36 See Deborah R. Hensler, Talking to Each Other or Talking Past Each Other? Corporate
Legal Officers' and Outside Counsels' Views on Strategies for Controlling Legal Costs, Paper
Presented at the 1992 American Bar Association Annual Meeting, at 7.
37 See id. at 15.
"See id. at 11-14.
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withheld until all of the appropriate facts have been developed. The
increasing adoption of a "managerial judging" style, including in-
creased involvement in managing discovery, has affected the judge's
role as a purely neutral umpire. But the American system continues to
rely on the parties' attorneys to develop the facts of the case.
Under European "inquisitorial" systems, the role of the judge in
developing the facts of the case is far greater; indeed, the judge may
be wholly responsible for deciding what issues are central to the dis-
pute, at what stage of the process to hear these issues and what evi-
dence should be brought to bear. For example, under the German
system, there is no sharp demarcation between pretrial proceedings
and trial: the judge hears the issues in the order that he or she feels is
most likely to assist in resolving the case. The parties' representatives
identify witnesses to appear before the judge, but apparently do not
engage in any extensive pretrial questioning of these witnesses. Nor do
they engage in any extensive investigation of the facts, beyond the
information they obtain from their clients."
Shifting the conduct of discovery to judges in the United States
would require a radical rethinking of the virtues of the adversarial
process; it would also require a rethinking of court organization. But
as an alternative to patchwork reforms of discovery that inexorably
draw the judge deeper into the investigatory process, perhaps without
sufficient evaluation of the larger consequences for civil case disposi-
tion, it may be appropriate to undertake such a systematic rethinking.
H. Some Obstacles to Reform
One of the obstacles to effective discovery reform has been the
failure of reformers to identify carefully the problem they are seeking
to remedy and the sources of that problem. For example, is the prob-
lem that there is too much discovery overall, or too much in some
specific types of cases? If it is the latter, in what types of cases is
discovery problematic? Answering these questions is important be-
cause it is difficult to set overall limits on the quantity of discovery that
are both effective for large numbers of cases and do not impair equity
in particular subsets of cases.
Is the problem that discovery prolongs litigation, or that it costs
too much? If both are of concern, which matters more? Answering this
question is important because some mechanisms for limiting the
39 Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for a TwaTier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1840-41 (1986).
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elapsed time for discovery may actually increase the amount of discov-
ery.
With regard to costs, is the problem that, regardless of its merits,
discovery costs too much, or that the costs are disproportionate to the
merits in too many cases? Discovery might cost too much because
lawyers' hourly fees are too high, because lawyers bill too many hours
for discovery activities that could be done more efficiently in less time,
or because lawyers engage in more discovery than is necessary. Court
rules may affect the latter, but court rules alone will not reduce lawyer
fees and lawyer hours.
Are the costs that are problematic the direct costs of the litigation
(e.g., legal fees) or the indirect burdens on parties (e.g., employee time
spent responding to discovery)? Or are these costs of equal concern?
Limiting burdens on the parties may require somewhat different strate-
gies than are required to limit direct litigation costs (such as limiting
party burdens by focusing more on ways to make document discovery
more efficient, and focusing more on reducing the amount of time
parties need to spend on identifying which information is privileged).
Not only has there been insufficient attention given to the nature
of the problems that need to be "fixed," there has also been insufficient
attention given to the source of the problems. Understanding the
source of the problems is important because without such an under-
standing reformers run the risk that the "fixes" they choose will be
ineffective. For example, if the absence of sanctions invites excessive
discovery and judges have incentives not to impose sanctions, one
cannot fix this problem simply by writing more sanctions into the
Rules. Instead one needs to invest in understanding why judges do not
use the sanctioning power they already have. If attorneys engage in
excessive discovery because they obtain lucrative fees from this prac-
tice, it might be more effective for clients to institute controls on
fees—for example, through alternative fee arrangements—than to in-
clude new restrictions on the amount of discovery into the Rules.
Alternatively, if attorneys engage in overly aggressive discovery
because they believe that is what their clients expect of them, perhaps
those clients need to be educated as to the relationship between what
they expect of their counsel and litigation costs. If the local legal
culture sometimes includes the use of overly aggressive discovery for
strategic purposes of imposing costs and delay on opposing parties,
which may sometimes drive inappropriate settlements or be a problem
for poorer parties, perhaps the local judiciary needs to become in-
volved more actively in managing discovery and signaling displeasure
with inappropriate discovery behavior by lawyers and parties.
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I. A Ward About the Future
Although we do not know of any major empirical research on the
correlation between the information technology explosion and discov-
ery, it seems reasonable to assume that the character and magnitude
of discovery is shaped in part by the availability of information tech-
nologies. All of us have observed the proliferation of paper and con-
tacts that have flowed from the availability of paper—copiers, faxes and
electronic communication. New computer technologies also facilitate
the storage and retrieval of information, which can now be accessed
from multiple databases with relatively few keystrokes. The implications
for discovery are truly mind-boggling. At the same time, many courts,
strapped for financial resources, are still struggling to move into the
computer age. Any consideration of discovery reforms must include
an assessment of how new information technologies are likely to affect
lawyers, clients, and the courts.
II. DESCRIPTION OF DISCOVERY COSTS AND OTHER INFORMATION
FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF CASES
Discovery is a major factor influencing both the length and the
cost of litigation. Our main evaluation report contains information
about general civil cases in the aggregate and about litigation costs
measured in terms of total lawyer work hours, but there has been
considerable interest expressed in having more detailed information
about various types of cases and about how total lawyer work hours are
broken down between discovery and other types of activities. This
section addresses those interests.
The data come from our sample of cases filed in 1992-93, after the
CJRA was enacted, and include closed general civil cases for which we
had at least one lawyer providing information. We provide various types
of information on each category of case, including time to disposition,
lawyer satisfaction with judicial case management, lawyer views on the
fairness of judicial case management, total lawyer work hours per
litigant, percentage of cases with zero discovery lawyer work hours,
lawyer work hours on discovery per litigant, the fraction of total lawyer
work hours devoted to discovery matters and the number of discovery
motions filed.
The various types of cases on which we provide information here
are categorized separately by:
• Case closure point: before issue joined, after issue joined and
closed in 270 days or less after filing, or after issue joined and closed
over 270 days after filing.
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• Case complexity: high, medium, or low (highest subjective rating
by any lawyer or judge on the case).
• Discovery difficulty: high, medium, or low (highest subjective
rating by any lawyer or judge on the case).
• Type of attorney: represented plaintiff or defendant.
• Type of private attorney fee: hourly or contingent (other types
of fee structures are not included here).
• Number of lawyers in firm or legal department of the organiza-
tion: more than five, or less.
• Monetary stakes: over $500,000, or less.
• Nature of suit: tort, contract, or other.
• Category of total lawyer work hours: bottom 75%, top 25%,4° or
top 10%.4 '
We present information on medians (half the cases have less than
the median, and half have more than the median) as the best available
measure of a "typical" case. We also present information on the average
total lawyer work hours and the average discovery lawyer work hours
as the best available measure of the expected cost of the average case.
We caution, however, that litigation in general is composed of many
cases without great costs, and a small fraction of cases with very high
costs. This high cost tail of the distribution of cases can contain a few
very big cases that strongly affect the average, but not the median.
Consequently, when comparing different types of cases the median is
a more stable measure, and too much emphasis should not be placed
on interpreting differences in the averages between subcategories of
cases.
A. Case Closure Point
In Table 2.1 we present information by case closure point. Note
that about a fourth of the general civil cases close before issue is joined,
about another fourth close after issue is joined and within 270 days
after filing, and nearly half close after issue is joined and more than
270 days after filing.
About three-fourths of the cases that close before issue is joined
have no lawyer work hours spent on discovery and 37% of those with
4° For general civil cases from the CjRA 1992-93 sample with issue joined that closed with
time to disposition over 270 days and had lawyer work hours reported, the top 25% had total
lawyer work hours per litigant of more than 188,
41 For general civil cases from the C1RA 1992-93 sample with issue joined that closed with
time to disposition over 270 days and had lawyer work hours reported, the top 25% had total
lawyer work hours per litigant of more than 450.
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issue joined that close within 270 days after filing have no lawyer work
hours on discovery. Only 15% of those that close at least 270 days after
filing, however, have no discovery costs. The median time lawyers
spend on discovery per litigant for cases with issue joined and closed
within 270 days after filing is only three hours, whereas the median is
twenty hours for those cases that close more than 270 days after filing.
Overall, lawyer work hours per litigant on discovery are zero for
38% of general civil cases and low for the majority of cases. The nearly
half of the cases that close more than 270 days after filing consume
about three-quarters of all lawyer work time, and about 80% of all
lawyer work time on discovery. Since we are most concerned with
discovery management policies in this document, we will focus the
remainder of the document on these general civil cases that close at
least 270 days after filing and consume the vast majority of lawyer work
time on discovery. 42
Discovery is not a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority
of cases. The empirical data show that any problems that may exist with
discovery are concentrated in a minority of the cases, and the evidence
indicates that discovery costs can be very high in some cases. Subjective
information from our interviews with lawyers also suggests that the
median or typical case is not "the problem." It is the minority of the
cases with high discovery costs that generate the anecdotal "parade of
horribles" that dominates much of the debate over discovery rules and
discovery case management. These findings suggest that policymakers
should consider focusing discovery rule changes and discovery man-
agement on the types of cases likely to have high discovery costs, and
the discovery practices that are likely to generate those high costs.
More attention and research is clearly needed on how to identify those
42
 Policies that significantly reduce time to disposition in long cases (cases with time to
disposition greater than 270 days) might not affect time to disposition for the entire population
of cases in the same way. Hence, our analyses on only cases with time to disposition greater than
270 days might not generalize to the entire population of cases, However, we feel that because
the courts and others are most concerned with reducing delay in long cases, exploring the effects
of case management policy on long cases is appropriate even if these effects might differ
somewhat for cases that close in less than 270 days.
Furthermore, additional analyses we conducted demonstrate that the policies of early man-
agement are associated with shorter time to disposition across the entire population of cases, not
only for cases that lasted over 270 days. In our main evaluation report, we compared the
percentage of a district's cases receiving early management to the percentage lasting over 270
days and found that more early management was associated with fewer cases lasting over 270 days.
In addition, we explored survival curves, See generally RUPERT C. MILLER, JR., SURVIVAL ANALYSIS
(1981), and found that they also suggest that early management policies will have effects on the
entire population. Combining all this evidence, we feel that policies with large effects on the long
cases are also likely to have effects on the entire population of cases.
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high discovery cost cases early in their life, and how best to manage
discovery on those cases.
B. How Lawyers Spend Their Time
In Table 2.2 we present information on how lawyers spend their
work hours on general civil cases that close at least 270 days after filing.
The average lawyer work hours per litigant is 232 hours, of which an
average of 36%, or 83 hours, is spent on discovery, including discovery
motions. In Table 2.1 we saw that the median percentage discovery
hours of total lawyer work hours is 25%. So, whether we consider
average or median percentages, discovery is about one-fourth to one-
third of total lawyer work hours per litigant. Discovery accounted for
less than half the lawyer work hours in all the subsets of general civil
cases that we examined.
C. Case Complexity
In Table 2.3 we present information on differences among cases
that are of high, medium, or low complexity, based on the highest
subjective complexity rating by any lawyer or the judge on the case.
Note that high complexity cases consume about four times as many
lawyer work hours as low complexity cases, but that the median per-
centage of total lawyer work time that is devoted to discovery is about
the same.
We conducted multivariate statistical analyses that included case
complexity as a factor in predicting time to disposition, total lawyer
work hours, lawyer work hours on discovery, lawyer satisfaction, and
lawyer views of fairness.'" Higher complexity cases take significantly
longer to close and require significantly more lawyer work hours than
lower complexity cases, but there is not a significant difference in
lawyer satisfaction or views on fairness of judicial case management for
cases of different complexity.
D. Discovery Difficulty
In Table 2.4 we present information on differences among cases
that are of high, medium, or low discovery difficulty, based on the
highest subjective rating by any lawyer or the judge on the case."
45 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF TILE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA app. (MR-941-1CJ
1997).
44 Lawyers and judges were asked, 1w1hen this litigation began, how would you have rated
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Not surprisingly, high discovery difficulty cases consume about
three times as many total lawyer work hours and five times as many
lawyer work hours on discovery as low discovery difficulty cases con-
sume. The median percentage of total lawyer work time that is devoted
to discovery on high discovery difficulty cases, however, is still only
33%.
We conducted multivariate statistical analyses that included discov-
ery difficulty as a factor in predicting time to disposition, total lawyer
work hours, lawyer work hours on discovery, lawyer satisfaction, and
lawyer views of fairness. 45 Higher discovery difficulty cases have sig-
nificantly higher lawyer work hours, both in total and on discovery, but
there is not a significant difference in lawyer satisfaction or views on
fairness of judicial case management for cases of different discovery
difficulty. Discovery difficulty was not a significant predictor of time to
disposition, after the analysis accounted for the other multiple factors
that are significant in predicting time to disposition.
E. Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Attorneys
In Table 2.5 we present information on differences between plain-
tiffs' and defendants' attorneys. Plaintiffs' attorneys reported spending
a median of 100 total work hours per litigant, whereas defendants'
attorneys reported spending a median of 75 total lawyer work hours
per litigant, and the difference is statistically significant. There is not
a significant difference between plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys
on lawyer work hours spent on discovery or on any of the other
variables that we tested.
F. Hourly and Contingent Fee Attorneys
In Table 2.6 we present information on hourly and contingent fee
attorneys (other types of fee structures are not included here because
of the limited amount of data we had about them). We did not find a
statistically significant difference between hourly and contingent fee
lawyers in predicting any of the time to disposition, total lawyer work
hours, lawyer work hours on discovery, satisfaction, or fairness meas-
ures that we analyzed statistically.
this case in terms of . . . difficulty of discovery . . ." It is possible that some people filling out
the survey after the litigation was closed reported greater difficulty of discovery because they knew
lawyer work hours were high, rather than reporting their initial views when the litigation began.
46 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app.
May 19981
	
DISCOVERY MANA GEMENT	 639
G. Size of Law Firm or Legal Department
In Table 2.7 we present information on differences between attor-
neys based on the size of the law firin or legal department: more than
five or less. Attorneys from larger Ofins work significantly more hours
per litigant, in total and on disccivery, than their counterparts from
smaller firms, although the fraction':Of time they spend on discovery is
about the same. In studying the data, we suspect there may be some
systematic bias by litigants in favor of hiring larger firms to handle the
more complex and more costly cases.
H. Size of Monetary Stakes
In Table 2.8 we present information on the size of the monetary
stakes, which we categorized into stakes over or under $500,000 in the
table. Our statistical analysis was conducted on the log of stakes." We
found that higher stakes are associated with significantly higher total
lawyer work hours, significantly higher lawyer work hours on discovery,
and significantly longer time to disposition, but that stakes are not
significantly related to satisfaction or fairness. Even for cases with stakes
over $500,000, the median percentage of lawyer work hours spent on
discovery was only 30%.
1. Nature of Suit
In Table 2.9 we present information on the nature of suit, catego-
rized as tort, contract, or other. We found no statistically significant
difference between those three categories of cases on any of the time
to disposition, lawyer work hours, satisfaction, or fairness measures. We
believe that the tort and contract categories are too aggregated, with
too heterogeneous a composition within each category, to be mean-
ingful in studying lawyer work hours and time to disposition. Smaller,
more narrowly defined categories should be studied, but we had too
few cases in our sample to do subcategories within tort, contract, and
other types of cases in detail.
Gases with Most Lawyer Work Hours
Finally, in Table 2.10 we present information by category of total
lawyer work hours: bottom 75%, top 25%, and top 10% of closed
cases.''? The top categories of the cases with the most total lawyer work
16 See KAttrunt ET AL, suftra note 43, app.
° About eight percent of our sample of cases remained open at the conclusion of our data
collection. They arc not included in this analysis.
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hours were obviously significantly more costly and had significantly
higher lawyer work hours spent on discovery, but they did not have
statistically significantly longer time to disposition after other variables
such as complexity and stakes were factored into the multivariate
analysis. The top 10% had a median of 950 total work hours per
litigant, a median of 300 lawyer work hours on discovery, and a median
percentage of lawyer work hours spent on discovery of 36%. These top
categories of the most costly cases in terms of lawyer work hours also
had significantly lower lawyer satisfaction with the judicial case man-
agement and a significantly lower percentage of the lawyers who felt
the judicial case management was fair.
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Table 2.1
Information by Case Closure Point: 1992-93 Sample, Closed
General Civil Cases with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Case Closure Point
Before Issue
Joined
After Issue
Joined, in
270 Days or Less
After Issue
. joined, over
270 Days
Percent in category 28 27 45
Median days to disposition 122 171 463
% lawyers satisfied with
management
65 72 73
% lawyers view management as fair 8 89 89
Median total lawyer work hours
per litigant
20 35 80
Average total lawyer work hours
per litigant
65  76 232
% with zero discovery work hours 72 37 15
Median lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
0 3 20
Average lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
13 21 83
Median percent discovery hours of
total lawyer work hours
0 14 25
Average number of discovery
motions on case
0.1 0.3 1.0
% of total lawyer work hours on
all eases
13 14 73
% of discovery lawyer work hours
on all cases
8 12 80
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.2
How Lawyers Spend Their Work Hours: 1992-93 Sample,
General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to
Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Type of Work
Average Lawyer
Work Hours
per Litigant
Percent
of Total
Trials, including direct preparation for
trial
26 11
Alternative dispute resolution after filing 6 3
Discovery after filing, including motions 83 36
Motion practice, excluding discovery 36 16
Other pretrial conferences or talks with
judicial officer
7 3
Other time worked after filing federal
case: on research, investigation, writing,
talking with parties and lawyers outside
court, or anything else related to the
litigation
55 24
All time worked before filing federal case,
in preparation for filing case
15 7
Total work hours per litigant 232 100
Note: Lawyers were asked the following question after case closure: "Approximately how
many of the total number of hours worked for your party or parties were spent on each of
the activities listed below? Again do not include activity related to state court, any govern-
ment administrative proceeding, or appellate litigation." Columns may not sum exactly due
to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.3
Information by Category of Case Complexity: 1992-93 Sample,
General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to
Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Case Complexity Significant DifferenceShown in Multivariate
Analysis?High Medium	 Low
Percent in category 23 61 16
Median days to disposition 594 463 392 Yes
% lawyers satisfied with
management
72 73 74 No
% lawyers view management
as fair
86 89 91 No
Median total lawyer work
hours per litigant
150 78 40 Yes	 ,
Average total lawyer work
hours per litigant
432 201 62
% with zero discovery work
hours
12  15 18
Median lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
42 20 10 No
Average lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
147 76 19
Median percent discovery
hours of total lawyer work
hours
28 25 27
Average number of discovery
motions on case
1.9 0.8 0.3
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.4
Information by Category of Discovery Difficulty: 1992-93 Sample,
General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to
Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Difficulty of Discovery Significant DifferenceShown in Multivariate
Analysis?High Medium Low
Percent in category 19 53 28
Median days to disposition 581 465 420 No
% lawyers satisfied with
management
73 72 75 No
% lawyers view management
as fair
86 89 90 No
Median total lawyer work hours
per litigant
140 96 49 Yes
Average total lawyer work hours
per litigant
503 215 74
% with zero discovery work
hours
8 12 24
Median lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
50 25 9 Yes
Average lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
205 73 17
Median percent discovery hours
of total lawyer work hours
33 27 20
Average number of discovery
motions on case
1.9 1.0 0.3
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.5
Information by Type of Attorney: 1992-93 Sample, General Civil
Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to Disposition over 270
Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Type of Attorney
Significant Difference
Shown in Multivariate
Analysis?Plaintiff Defendant
Percent in category 42 58
Median days to disposition 459 471
% lawyers satisfied with
management
72 74 No
% lawyers view management as fair 88 89 No
Median total lawyer work hours
per litigant
100 75 Yes
Average total lawyer work hours
per litigant
271 204
% with zero discovery work hours 13 16
Median lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
20 20 No
Average lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
96 74
Median percent discovery hours
of total lawyer work hours
25 29
Average number of discovery
motions on case
0.9 1.0
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 clue to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.6
Information by Type of Private Attorney Fee: 1992-93 Sample,
General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to
Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Type of Private
Attorney Fee' Significant DifferenceShown in Multivariate
Analysis?Hourly Contingent
% lawyers satisfied with
management
72 73 No
% lawyers view management as fair 89 87 No
Median total lawyer work hours
per litigant
83 95 No
Average total lawyer work hours
per litigant
269 177
% with zero discovery work hours 15 10
Median lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
21 20 No
Average lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
107 46
Median percent discovery hours of
total lawyer work hours
27 27
Average number of discovery
motions on case
1.0 0.9
a Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data. Types
of attorneys and fees not shown in the table include prepaid legal insurance attorneys,
government attorneys who were an employee of a party, private attorneys who were full time
employees of a party, attorneys with mixed fee arrangements, and attorneys who charged
no fee.
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Table 2.7
Information by Size of Firm or Legal Department: 1992-93
Sample, General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time
to Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours
Reported
Variable
Number of Lawyers in Firm
or Legal Department Significant DifferenceShown in
Multivariate Analysis?More Than Five Five or Less
Percent in category 68 31
Median days to disposition 460 473
% lawyers satisfied with
management
73 75 No
% lawyers view management
as fair
89 89 No
Median total lawyer work
hours per litigant
90 66 Yes
Average total lawyer work
hours per litigant
275 137
% with zero discovery work
hours
14 17
Median lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
21 15 Yes
Average lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
101 44
Median percent discovery
hours of total lawyer work
hours
26 25
Average number of discovery
motions on case
1.0 0.8
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.8
Information by Size of Monetary Stakes: 1992-93 Sample,
General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to
Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Monetary Stakes Significant
Difference Shown
in Multivariate
Analysis?
Over
$500,000
$500,000 or
Less, Greater
Than Zero
Percent in category 28 61
Median days to disposition 537 447 Yes
% lawyers satisfied with
management
68 77 No
% lawyers view management
as fair
89 90 No
Median total lawyer work
hours per litigant
172 68 Yes
Average total lawyer work
hours per litigant
483 126
% with zero discovery work
hours
9 14
Median lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
48 17 Yes
Average lawyer work hours on
discovery per litigant
190 36
Median percent discovery
hours of total lawyer work
hours
30 25
Average number of discovery
motions on case
1.5 0.8
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.9
Information by Nature of Suit: 1992-93 Sample, General Civil
Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to Disposition over 270
Days and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Variable
Nature of Suit
Significant
Difference
Shown in
Multivariate
Analysis?Tort Contract Other
Percent in category 26 24 50
Median days to disposition 477 430 477 No
% lawyers satisfied with
management
76 73 71 No
% lawyers view management
as fair
91 88 88 No
Median total lawyer work
hours per litigant
80 100 70 No
Average total lawyer work
hours per litigant
147 312 239
% with zero discovery work
hours
7 15 18
Median lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
25 25 17 No
Average lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
48 104 92
Median percent discovery
hours of total lawyer work
hours
30 25 25
Average number of discovery
motions on case
1.0 1.0 0.9
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 2.10
Information by Category of Total Lawyer Work Hours: 1992-93
Sample, General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time
to Disposition over 270 Days and with Lawyer Work Hours
Reported
Variable
Category of Total
Lawyer Work Hours
Significant
Difference
Shown in
Multivariate
Analysis?Bottom 75% Top 25% Top 10%
Percent in category 75 25 10
Median days to disposition 442 578 618 No
% lawyers satisfied with
management
76 64 57 Yes
% lawyers view management
as fair
90 83 75 Yes
Median total lawyer work
hours per litigant
55 375 950 Yes
Average total lawyer work
hours per litigant
66 730 1,452
% with zero discovery work
hours
17 6 4
Median lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
12 100 300 Yes
Average lawyer work hours
on discovery per litigant
19 280 601
Median percent discovery
hours of total lawyer
work hours
25 33 36
Average number of discovery
motions on case
0.6 2.0 2.8
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding, missing data, and inclusion
of top 10 percent within numbers shown for top 25 percent.
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III. EVALUATION OF VARIOUS DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT POLICIES
A. Introduction
Discovery management policies include the CJRA principles of
early and ongoing judicial control of pretrial processes such as discov-
ery, requiring lawyers to prepare jointly a discovery/case management
plan early in the case, exchanging information early without formal
discovery, requiring good-faith :efforts to resolve discovery disputes
before filing motions and limiting interrogatories and other forms of
discovery:if'
To conduct this further evaluation of discovery management poli-
cies, discovery management policy information was obtained at the
district level from court documents, local rules and interviews with
judges and clerks in each of the twenty study districts. In addition,
discovery management information was obtained at the case level from
over 5000 court dockets and from lawyer surveys for cases filed in
1992-93, after the CJRA was passed. For each case, we learned when
the judge started managing the case, if a trial schedule had been set,
if a discovery schedule had been set, and, if so, when and how much
time was allowed between the date the schedule was set and the date
of discovery cutoff. From the dockets, we also learned if any discovery
motions had been filed. Details of discovery management at the case
level, however, such as limitations on depositions or requirements for
sequencing of discovery, are usually not recorded on the docket and
so were not available. We also surveyed the lawyers on each case to
learn how much time they worked on the case and how much of that
work time was devoted to discovery, to learn if early disclosure of
information was made without a formal discovery request and to learn
if good faith efforts had been made to resolve discovery disputes before
a motion was filed.
The remaining five subsections of this section contain our evalu-
ation of the following five types of discovery management policies:
• Early case management and discovery planning,
• Early disclosure,
• Good-faith efforts in resolving discovery disputes,
• Limiting interrogatories, and
• Shortening discovery cutoff time.
For details of each district's CJRA plan and its implementation, see generally JAMES S.
KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF CIRA, supra note 1.
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Due to lack of sufficient data, we could not evaluate policies
limiting the number or length of depositions, limiting document dis-
covery, or dealing with issues of privilege. We also had insufficient
data to evaluate methods lawyers use to manage discovery outside the
court's purview:19
B. Early Case Management and Discovery Planning
All of the twenty study courts' CJRA plans accepted the principle
of early and ongoing judicial control of the pretrial process. Case
management styles varied considerably, however, between districts and
between judges in a given district. Four of the ten pilot districts re-
quired that counsel jointly present a discovery/case management plan
at the initial pretrial conference, and nine of the other pilot and
comparison districts later adopted this management technique after
our sample cases were selected when the December 1993 Federal Rules
changes were made.
In our statistical analyses, we defined early judicial case manage-
ment as any schedule, conference, status report, joint plan, or referral
to ADR within 180 days of case filing. This definition gives time for
nearly all cases to have service and answer or other appearance of the
defendants (which legally can take up to six months)—so issue is
joined and it is appropriate to begin management if the judge wants
to do so. We also explored alternative definitions of "early" using time
periods other than six months, with results similar to those reported
here.
1. Lawyer Work Hours
In our main evaluation report, we estimated a statistically sig-
nificant increase in total lawyer work hours from early management.
There were no consistent statistically significant differences for any of
the components of early management considered separately.
Our main evaluation report showed that attorneys shown on the
docket to have filed status reports or joint discovery/case management
plans before day 180 in the life of the case did not have significantly
different work hours than attorneys on cases with other forms of early
management. On the other hand, we found that attorneys from dis-
tricts with a policy that required early status reports or joint plans did
49 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app.
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report statistically significantly fewer work hours than attorneys from
other districts.w
We explored this difference in our findings between case-level and
district-level data in some depth in our further analysis of judicial
discovery management policies, and learned that the case-level data
are not reliable because of major differences in docketing practices
between districts that require plans or status reports. The dockets that
say a discovery plan was submitted are generally accurate, but the
dockets that are silent on the subject of a discovery plan can mean
either no plan was submitted, or a plan was submitted to the court but
that fact was not separately shown on the docket. The case-level infor-
mation on whether or not a discovery plan had been submitted was
dropped from this further study because the docketing practices re-
garding the submission of those plans or reports were found to vary
markedly between districts, making that case-level variable undesirable
for statistical analyses across districts.
In our further analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we found that early management is associated with significantly in-
creased total lawyer work hours if the district does not require discov-
ery/case management plans. We estimated that early management
without a mandatory planning policy increases work hours between
twenty-six or thirty-one hours depending on whether or not early
management includes trial setting.5 ' Early management is not associ-
ated with significantly increased total lawyer work hours, however, if
the district requires discovery/case management plans. We estimate
almost no effect on lawyer work hours for the typical case with early
management that includes a mandatory planning policy. 52 This lends
strong support for the continuation of a requirement of discovery/case
management planning. That is, it appears that doing early manage-
ment without planning increases lawyer work hours, but early manage-
ment coupled with planning does not increase lawyer work hours.
Our interviews suggested reasons why early management may
increase lawyer work hours. Lawyers need to respond to a court's
management—for example, talking to the litigant and to the other
55 This result holds when we use either the infra-district correlation-adjusted or unadjusted
standard errors.
51 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app. tbl. A.13.
52 Although the estimated effect is an hour or less, our 95% confidence intervals range from
-19 to 18 hours if catty setting of a trial schedule is included and -20 to 28 hours if early setting
of a trial schedule is not included in the policy applied to the case. These confidence intervals
indicate that although we estimate almost no effect, there is a possibility that the policies might
reduce lawyer work or might increase lawyer work by as much as about three days.
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lawyers in advance of a conference with the judge, traveling, spending
time waiting at the courthouse, meeting with the judge and updating
the file after the conference. In addition, once judicial case manage-
ment has begun, a discovery cutoff date has usually been established
and attorneys may feel an obligation to begin discovery. Doing so could
shorten time to disposition, but it may also increase lawyer work hours
on cases that were about to settle when the judge began early manage-
ment. The CJIZA data indicate that cases that are managed early have
a higher likelihood of having at least some lawyer hours spent on
disCovery.
When a district requires discovery/case management plans, how-
ever, the increase in lawyer work hours associated with early manage-
ment appears to be offset by benefits associated with the required
planning, and the net effect is no significant increase in lawyer work
hours. There are at least two plausible explanations for this outcome.
First, the planning itself may produce the benefit. The requirement
that the lawyers jointly meet and prepare a discovery/case manage-
ment plan for submission to the court may result in more efficient
litigation with less lawyer work hours. Another plausible explanation is
that the judges in districts that require plans also may manage cases
differently and better (in ways that we did not measure) than judges
in districts that do not require plans.
When we looked at various subsets of cases, we found no strong
evidence that the effects of early management and discovery planning
were systematically concentrated on certain types of cases based on
level of complexity, level of discovery difficulty, plaintiff or defendant
side of the case, contingent or hourly fee lawyer, size of the law organi-
zation in which the lawyer worked, case stakes, tort or contract or other
nature of suit categories, or the top 25% most costly cases among
general civil litigation that has time to disposition over 270 days after
filing."
In addition to the further analysis that we did on total lawyer work
hours, we also analyzed lawyer work hours on discovery. The policy
implications and findings of statistical significance emerging from our
analysis of lawyer work hours on discovery are very similar to those
from our analysis of total lawyer work hours.
55 These cases had total lawyer work hours per litigant of more than 188.
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2. Time to Disposition
In our main evaluation report; using only cases with time to
disposition over 270 days, we found• that early management predicted
significantly shorter time to disposition. We explored the component
procedures of early management separately in our main evaluation
report, and fit a separate model for each component. This model
includes both a flag for early management as well as a flag for the
particular early management procedure. For example, to explore the
specific effect of setting a trial schedule prior to the 180th day of the
case, we fit a model that includes our early management flag and a
flag that is one if the case received a trial schedule before day 180 and
zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient for the trial schedule flag
estimates the difference between cases that receive early management
that includes setting the trial schedule and those that receive early
management but do not include setting the trial schedule early. Using
this approach, we found that cases where a trial schedule was set before
day 180 had statistically significantly shorter time to disposition than
did cases receiving other types of early management. We found no
statistically significant differences for conferences or mandatory arbi-
tration, and we had mixed results for schedules in general and status
reports or joint discovery/case management plans. Hence, we con-
cluded that there was not strong evidence that this joint discovery/case
management plan policy was an important predictor of time to dispo-
sition.
In our further analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found that a statistically significant reduction in time to
disposition was associated with early management without setting a trial
schedule early, and a significantly larger reduction was associated with
early management that included setting a trial schedule early. In our
further analysis, we considered those two early management and trial
scheduling policies used both with and without a discovery plan re-
quirement, and the results were statistically significant. There was little
difference in time to disposition with or without a discovery plan if a
trial was scheduled early, but cases closed earlier if discovery planning
took place in the absence of an early trial schedule." Thus, our further
analysis suggests that the requirement of a discovery/case management
51 If we use the standard errors adjusted for infra-district correlation as discussed in the
appendix to our RAND report MR-941—ICJ, 1997, then early management without an early
scheduling of a trial and without a discovery plan does not significantly reduce time to disposition
(coefficient = —0.062, p = 0.169 for cases that close over 270 days after filing).
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plan is beneficial in reducing time to disposition, especially if a trial
schedule is not set early. And we indicated above that the use of
discovery plans appears to have beneficial effects in controlling lawyer
work time.
Early management with a mandatory planning policy reduces time
spent on a typical case by an estimated 104 days when a trial schedule
is set early, and by about 85 days for early management with a manda-
tory planning policy but without setting a trial schedule early. The
estimated reduction for early management with neither mandatory
planning nor setting a trial schedule early is much smaller—only about
29 days.55
Our statistical analysis of subsets of cases does not lead to any
suggestions for focusing these management policies only on certain
types of cases. Our statistical results are consistent for most subsets of
cases analyzed, although the top 25% most costly cases appear to
benefit especially from the early setting of a trial schedule (early man-
agement of those top 25% of the costly cases without a trial date
scheduled was not associated with significantly reduced time to dispo-
sition). And cases that are high in complexity, high in discovery dif-
ficulty, or high in stakes appear to benefit especially from the use of
discovery/case management plans.
3. Attorney Satisfaction
In our main evaluation report, we found no statistically significant
effects on attorney satisfaction for early case management in our model
with cases closed over 270 days after filing. Furthermore, we found no
statistically significant differences in attorney satisfaction for cases re-
ceiving any of the components of early management (such as requiring
a status report or discovery/case management plan or an early setting
of a trial date) compared to cases not receiving the component.
In our further analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again find no statistically significant effect on lawyer satisfaction
from early management, setting a trial schedule early in the case and
requiring a discovery plan. We considered those three policies used in
various combinations and did not find any significant difference in
satisfaction, although as noted previously, some of those policies do
significantly affect time to disposition and lawyer work hours.
Our statistical analysis of subsets of cases does not lead to any
suggestions for focusing these management policies on certain types
55 See KAKALII ET AL., Supra note 43, app. tbl. A.?
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of cases. Our statistical results are consistent for nearly all subsets of
cases analyzed, including the top 25% most costly cases.
4. Attorneys' Views on Fairness
We found no statistically significant effects for any of the policy
variables on attorneys' views on fairness.
5. Information by Type of Early Management and Discovery Plan
Policy
Table 3.1 presents information on time to disposition, lawyer work
hours, satisfaction, and views on fairness for cases that were and were
not subject to an early management and joint discovery/case manage-
ment plan. The numbers in the table, which reflect actual survey
responses from the sample cases, generally corroborate the results of
the statistical analysis. We caution, however, that the districts, and the
cases from those districts, differ on factors other than the policies on
early management and discovery planning. Our multivariate analyses
adjust for those other factors, and the bivariate Table 3.1 does not.
C. Early Disclosure
CJRA brought about substantial change in early disclosure among
our study districts. Only one district required it before CJRA; 56 after
CiRA, all pilot and comparison districts have adopted one of five
approaches providing either voluntary or mandatory exchange of in-
formation by lawyers, sometimes only for specified types of cases. Three
pilot and two comparison districts adopted the voluntary exchange
model, which encourages lawyers to cooperate in exchanging informa-
tion. Three pilot districts and one comparison district followed a man-
datory exchange model for a limited subset of cases and a voluntary
model on other cases. Two pilot districts and one comparison district
required lawyers to disclose mandatorily certain information, includ-
ing anything bearing significantly on their sides' claims or defenses.
Two other pilot districts and one other comparison district have a
similar mandatory requirement, but they apply it to all information
bearing significantly on both sides' claims or defenses.
The December 1993 revised Rule 26(a) (1), which requires the
mandatory exchange of information relevant to disputed facts alleged
56 At least one other district required attorneys to confer before the first pretrial conference
to attempt to agree on a scheduling order.
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with particularity in the pleadings plus information on damages and
insurance, was implemented after our sample of cases was selected, and
hence cannot be evaluated with our CJRA data. After our sample cases
were selected, four pilot districts switched from their initial early dis-
closure procedure, and six comparison districts decided to follow the
revised Rule 26(a) (1). The ten other pilot and comparison districts
decided to opt out and are not following the revised Rule 26(a) (1).
Some districts opted out to retain their pilot program disclosure rules,
some of which were more stringent in their disclosure requirements
than the revised Rule 26(a) (1).
RAND's lawyer surveys indicate that when early disclosure was
made for cases in the 1992-93 sample, it was "full disclosure" 57% of
the time, and "pro forma" disclosure 43% of the time. For general civil
cases with issue joined, lawyers report more disclosure when it is man-
datory (60% of the cases in mandatory disclosure districts, versus 45%
in voluntary disclosure districts and 40% in districts with no disclosure
policy). Part of the problem with a mandatory early disclosure require-
ment is compliance; lawyers report that when disclosure is done on a
mandatory basis, it is full disclosure for 50% of the cases and pro forma
disclosure for the other half of the cases.
When one party does not comply with mandatory early disclosure,
the other side's lawyer may ignore the problem, make a formal discov-
ery request, or file a motion requesting the court to force compliance.
According to our analysis of dockets on over 5000 cases, and according
to judges we have interviewed in pilot and comparison districts that
implemented their plans in December 1991, such compliance motions
are extremely rare. Despite the dire warnings of critics of early man-
datory disclosure, we did not find any explosion of ancillary litigation
and motion practice related to disclosure in any of the pilot or com-
parison districts using mandatory disclosure.
I. Lawyer Work Hours
In our main evaluation report, we found no statistically significant
difference in lawyer work hours between cases where the attorneys
reported disclosure of relevant information and cases where there was
no early disclosure. We also found that attorneys representing cases in
districts with some type of mandatory disclosure policy had work hours
that were not statistically significantly different from hours worked by
attorneys in other districts. It should be noted, however, that in our
main evaluation report we found that attorney work hours were sig-
nificantly lower for the three districts that had a particular type of
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mandatory disclosure: early mandatory disclosure of information bearing
on both sides of the dispute. With only three districts using this particular
type of mandatory disclosure policy, however, it is difficult to generalize
this statistical finding.
We could not evaluate the mandatory disclosure prescribed under
the December 1993 amendments to Rule 26(a) (1) because our sample
of cases was selected well before that amendment took effect, and none
of our study districts had a mandatory disclosure policy that was exactly
the same as the amended Rule 26(a) (1) when our sample cases were
selected. Hence, the "empirical" story of the effects of Rule 26(a) (1)
remains to be told.
We found that a district policy encouraging voluntary early disclo-
sure had no statistically significant effect on attorney work hours. We
found small and not statistically significant differences in work hours
between lawyers on cases from districts with a voluntary early disclosure
policy compared to lawyers from districts with no general policy on
early disclosure.°
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found that mandatory early disclosure requirements were not
associated with significantly reduced lawyer work hours. Regardless of
whether early disclosure occurs, cases from districts with mandatory
early disclosure policies tend to have similar estimated lawyer work
hours as cases from districts without a mandatory disclosure policy that
had no early disclosure. The confidence intervals are large so there is
a possibility that mandatory early disclosure policies could reduce or
increase lawyer work hours, 58 but our best estimate is a small eight hour
increase if early disclosure is conducted and no effect if no early
disclosure occurs in districts with a mandatory disclosure policy. Some
people suggested that if we had looked at subsets of cases, such as those
that were more or less complex or had more or less difficulty with
discovery, we might have found a subset of cases for which this policy
was effective. We have explored many different subsets of cases, includ-
ing subsets based on stakes, complexity and discovery difficulty. We
found no strong evidence that a policy of early mandatory disclosure
reduced lawyer work time on any of the subsets of cases examined.
Attorneys who voluntarily choose to do early disclosure, however,
in districts where such disclosure is voluntary, have significantly lower
work hours. Cases with voluntary early disclosure required an esti-
mated fourteen fewer work hours than cases without voluntary disclo-
57 Coefficiera = 0.236, p = 0,129 for cases closed over 270 days after filing.
's See KAKALtic LT AL., supra note 43, app. tbl. A.13.
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sure. It may be that lower work hours among voluntary disclosing
attorneys reflect a type of "choice or selection bias," i.e., attorneys on
cases for which they voluntarily choose to disclose may be less conten-
tious attorneys or may be on less contentious cases and hence spend
fewer total work hours on the case, but not necessarily because of the
early disclosure.
In addition to the further analysis that we did on total lawyer work
hours, we also analyzed lawyer work hours on discovery. The policy
implications and findings of statistical significance emerging from our
analysis of lawyer work hours on discovery are very similar to those
from our analysis of total lawyer work hours. We focus our discussion
on the total lawyer work hours, however, because we think the total is
a better measure of the cost of litigation than the lawyer hours spent
on discovery. Our interviews suggest that some types of discovery
management may reduce discovery hours by shifting lawyer work to
other types of activity (disclosure as a substitute for some discovery, for
example).
2. Time to Disposition
In our main evaluation report, we found no statistically significant
difference in time to disposition between cases from districts that have
a policy of mandatory disclosure and those that do not. Furthermore,
in separate model runs, we found that cases from districts with a policy
of mandatory disclosure of information bearing on both sides of the
case did not differ significantly in terms of time to disposition from
other cases. 59 Also, we found that cases where the attorneys reported
an early disclosure of relevant information were not statistically sig-
nificantly different from other cases in terms of time to disposition. 60
We also found that a district policy encouraging voluntary early disclo-
sure had no statistically significant effect on time to disposition. Cases
from districts with a voluntary early disclosure policy were compared
to cases from districts with no general policy on early disclosure. 6'
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again find that early disclosure requirements are not associated with
6° Coefficient 0.04, p = 0.37 for cases closing over 270 days after filing.
6o We imputed the missing values of our early disclosure variable and found that our result
was not sensitive to the particular imputed values.
61 Coefficient = 0.045, p = 0.416 for cases closed over 270 days after filing. Some districts
had policies on early disclosure for a limited number of cases. We considered these districts to
have no general policy of early disclosure and included them in our comparison group for
studying the effects of voluntary and mandatory early disclosure.
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significantly reduced time to disposition. Our estimated effects for
early disclosure indicate that the policies reduce time to disposition by
about twenty days or less for a typical case. For all three early disclosure
policies, the confidence intervals cross zero. 62
Some people suggested that if we had looked at subsets of cases,
such as those that were more or less complex or had more or less
difficulty with discovery, we might have found a subset of cases for
which this policy was effective. We have explored many different sub-
sets of cases, including subsets based on stakes, complexity and discov-
ery difficulty. We found no strong evidence that a policy of early
mandatory disclosure shortened time to disposition on any of the
subsets of cases examined.
3. Attorney Satisfaction
In our main evaluation report, we found that a district policy of
mandatory early disclosure corresponded to statistically significantly
lower attorney satisfaction. For cases in which the attorneys report the
actual early disclosure of information, however, they also report sig-
nificantly higher satisfaction than attorneys from other cases.
A district policy of voluntary early disclosure is associated with
fewer satisfied attorneys, but our estimated effects are small and not
statistically significant." Our model compared attorney responses from
districts with a policy of voluntary early disclosure to the responses
from attorneys from districts with no general policy on early disclosure.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found that attorneys from districts with a mandatory disclo-
sure policy were less satisfied, but their level of satisfaction was not
significantly different from the level of satisfaction for attorneys who
did not do early disclosure in voluntary disclosure districts. Attorneys
who voluntarily choose to do early disclosure, however, in districts
where such disclosure is voluntary, are significantly more satisfied.
Since most districts had a voluntary disclosure policy at the time of the
study, this explains the overall finding in our main evaluation report
that disclosing attorneys were more satisfied. It may be that greater
satisfaction among voluntary disclosing attorneys reflects a type of
"choice or selection bias," i.e., attorneys on cases for which they volun-
tarily choose to disclose may be less contentious attorneys or may be
62 See KAKALIK ST AL., supra note 43, app. dd. A.7.
63 Coefficient = —0.070, p = 0.835 for cases that close over 270 days after filing.
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on less contentious cases and hence more satisfied, but not necessarily
because of the early disclosure.
Our statistical analysis of subsets of cases does not lead to any
suggestions for focusing these management policies on certain types
of cases. Our statistical results are consistent for most subsets of cases
analyzed, including the top 25% most costly cases.
4. Attorneys' Views on Fairness
We found no statistically significant effects for any of the policy
variables on attorneys' views on fairness.
5. Information by Early Disclosure Policy
Table 3.2 presents information on time to disposition, lawyer work
hours, satisfaction and views on fairness for cases that were and were
not subject to an early disclosure policy. The numbers in the table,
which reflect actual survey responses from the sample cases, generally
corroborate the results of the statistical analysis. We caution, however,
that the districts and the cases from those districts differ on factors
other than the policy on early disclosure. Our multivariate analyses
adjust for those other factors, and the bivariate Table 3.2 does not.
D. Good-Faith Efforts in Resolving Discovery Disputes
Before CjItA, all but one district in the study had rules requiring
good-faith efforts to resolve disputes before filing discovery motions;
these rules have been continued or strengthened as required by the
CJIZA, Since our main evaluation report did not find any significant
relationship between good-faith efforts and the variables studied, we
did not do any further investigation of this policy in this report. Our
main evaluation report findings on good-faith efforts are summarized
below, however.
1. Lawyer Work Hours
In our main evaluation report, we explored the effects of good-
faith efforts in resolving discovery disputes before filing motions using
only cases with at least one motion. We found no statistically significant
effects of good-faith efforts on work hours among attorneys from these
cases. 64 It could be that by restricting our attention to only cases with
64 Coefficient = 0.27, p = 0.06 for cases closed over 270 days after filing.
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motions, we miss the helpful effect of good-faith effort on avoiding
motions; the positive effects we observe (i.e., good-faith effort increases
work hours, but not significantly) do not suggest, however, any reduc-
tion in work hours from good-faith motions.
2. Time to Disposition
In our main evaluation report, we found no evidence of significant
effects on time to disposition from good-faith efforts to resolve discov-
ery disputes before filing motions. Looking at cases with at least one
discovery motion, we found no statistically significant difference be-
tween cases where the attorney reported good-faith efforts and other
cases. 65
We did not do any further investigation of this policy in this
document.
3. Attorney Satisfaction
In our main evaluation report, we explored the effects of good-
faith efforts in resolving discovery disputes using only cases with at least
one motion. We found that case-level-reported good-faith effort in
resolving discovery disputes had no statistically significant effects on
lawyer satisfaction.
4. Attorneys' Views on Fairness
We estimated the effects of good-faith efforts in resolving discov-
ery disputes using a subsample of cases that had at least one discovery
motion in our main evaltiation report. Using this sample there was
no statistically significant effect for cases with one or more discovery
motions.66
E. Limiting Interrogatories
Before CJRA, most districts left court control of the volume of
discovery to the judge in each case; CJRA had little effect on this
arrangement. Before CJRA, most pilot and comparison districts had a
local rule that limited the number of interrogatories and requests for
admission, but none limited the number of depositions and only one
limited the time per deposition. After CJRA, one pilot and one com-
parison district adopted a new limit on deposition length, and two
°Coefficient = —0.01, p = 0.81 for cases closed over 270 clays after filing.
66 Coefficient = 0.45, p = 0.23 for cases that had time to disposition over 270 clays.
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comparison districts adopted new limits on the number of depositions.
Given the small number of districts that had a policy limiting deposi-
dons, we have insufficient data to evaluate that policy. Hence, this
subsection focuses on limits on interrogatories.
1. Lawyer Work Hours
In our main evaluation report, a district policy on limiting inter-
rogatories predicted fewer lawyer work hours; however, this difference
was not statistically significant. In our current and more detailed analy-
sis of judicial discovery management policies, we found a significant
reduction in total lawyer work hours in districts with interrogatory
limitations. We estimate that limiting interrogatories will reduce lawyer
work by about sixteen hours. 67
Looking at subsets of cases, the significant reductions appeared
for hourly fee attorneys, defense attorneys, contract cases and medium
complexity cases. These findings support the policy of limiting inter-
rogatories as a means of limiting lawyer work hours because there is
no statistical evidence that interrogatory limitations hurt, and they may
help for several subsets of cases.
In addition to the further analysis that we did on total lawyer work
hours, we also analyzed lawyer work hours on discovery. The policy
implications and findings of statistical significance emerging from our
analysis of lawyer work hours on discovery are very similar to those
from our analysis of total lawyer work hours.
2. Time to Disposition
In our main evaluation report, we found that a district policy on
limiting interrogatories was not a statistically significant predictor of
shorter time to disposition for cases closed over 270 days after filing.
Thus, we concluded that our data provided almost no evidence of an
effect of district policies of limiting interrogatories on dine to disposi-
tion.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we found a significant reduction in time to disposition using unad-
justed standard errors, but there was not a significant reduction when
we used the standard errors adjusted for intra-district correlation.ss
67 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app. thl. A.13. This estimate has rather large confidence
bounds, which are the result of the small variation in the data, because only four of our 20 study
districts did not have limits on interrogatories during the study time period.
68 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app. Coefficient = - 0.068, p = 0.386 for cases that close
over 270 days after filing.
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Our estimated effect for a district policy limiting the number of inter-
rogatories is relatively small with large confidence bounds.° Analyses
on subsets of cases also showed no significant effects for nearly all
subsets. Consequently, we again conclude that our data provide almost
no evidence of an effect of district policies of limiting interrogatories
on time to disposition.
3. Attorney Satisfaction
In our main evaluation report, we found no statistically significant
effect for a district policy limiting interrogatories for all cases with issue
joined. On the other hand, in our analysis of cases closed over 270 days
after filing, attorneys from districts with a policy of limiting interroga-
tories reported being significantly more satisfied with case manage-
ment.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found that districts with a policy of limiting interrogatories
had attorneys who report significantly higher satisfaction. This finding
also was true for most subsets of cases analyzed, and there was no
indication of a significant negative effect for any subset of cases.
4. Attorneys' Views on Fairness
We found no statistically significant effects for any of the policy
variables on attorneys' views on fairness.
5. Information by Interrogatory Limitation Policy
Table 3.3 presents information on time to disposition, lawyer work
hours, satisfaction, and views on fairness for cases that were and were
not subject to a district policy of limiting the number of interrogato-
ries. The numbers in the table, which reflect actual survey responses
from the sample cases, generally corroborate the results of the statisti-
cal analysis. One is not able to see the reduction in lawyer work hours
predicted by a policy of limiting interrogatories in the bivariate tables,
however, because the districts and the cases from those districts differ
on factors other than the limitation on interrogatories. Our multivari-
ate analyses adjust for those other factors, and the bivariate Table 3.3
does not.
69 See KAKALIK ST AL., supra note 43, app. tbl. A.7.
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F. Shortening Discovery Cutoff Time
Discovery clearly was subject to more management in 1992-93
after CJRA was passed. In addition to the new mandatory early disclo-
sure requirements in some districts, the median district times to dis-
covery cutoff were shortened in some districts. For example, in 1991
the fastest and slowest districts' median days from schedule to discovery
cutoff were 100 and 274 days, respectively, for all general civil cases
closed after issue was joined. In 1992-93, these medians had fallen to
83 and 217 days, respectively.
1. Lawyer Work Hours
In our main evaluation report, we found that reported lawyer work
hours significantly decrease as the district median days from the setting
of a discovery schedule to the discovery cutoff date gets shorter."
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again find that reported total lawyer work hours significantly de-
crease as the number of district median days to discovery cutoff gets
smaller. We estimate that a sixty-day reduction in the district median
discovery cutoff (from 180 days to 120 days) will reduce lawyer work
by fifteen hours and we are quite confident that this policy will lead to
at least some reduction in work hours. 7 ' When we looked at subsets of
cases, this significant decrease occurred for most subsets, with sonic
exceptions such as low complexity and low discovery difficulty cases
(which are unlikely to require as much time for discovery as more
complex or more difficult cases).
In addition to the further analysis that we did on total lawyer work
hours, we also analyzed lawyer work hours on discovery. The policy
implications and findings of statistical significance emerging from our
analysis of lawyer work hours on discovery are very similar to those
from our analysis of total lawyer work hours.
2. Time to Disposition
In our main evaluation report, we found that the district's median
days to discovery cutoff was a statistically significant predictor of time
to disposition; shorter cutoff predicts shorter time to disposition."
"The dine to discovery cutoff for each case was not used in this analysis because of potential
bias in the multivariate regression results due to missing case descriptors that are correlated with
discovery cutoff time for the case.
71 See Kamm ET AL., supra note 43, app. tbl. A.13.
"The statistical significance holds even if we use adjusted standard errors. The time to
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In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found that the district's median days to discovery cutoff was
a statistically significant predictor of time to disposition. We estimated
that reducing median discovery cutoff time had a large effect. We
expect that for a typical case, a sixty-day reduction in the median
discovery cutoff (from 180 days to 120 days) would correspond to
about a fifty-five-day reduction in time to disposition," In our analysis
of subsets of cases, we found that reducing time to discovery cutoff
significantly reduced time to disposition on most subsets of cases ana-
lyzed.
3. Attorney Satisfaction
In our main evaluation report, we found no statistically significant
relationship between the district median days to discovery cutoff and
attorney satisfaction.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found no statistically significant relationship between the
district median days to discovery cutoff and attorney satisfaction.
4. Attorneys' Views on Fairness
We found no statistically significant effects for any of the policy
variables on attorneys' views on fairness.
5. Information on Discovery Cutoff Time Policy
Table 3.4 presents information on time to disposition, lawyer work
hours, satisfaction, and views on fairness for cases from districts with
shorter and longer times from discovery scheduling to cutoff.
"Shorter" means the cases in the ten study districts with the shortest
median discovery time to cutoff. The numbers in the table, which
reflect actual survey responses from the sample cases, generally cor-
roborate the results of the statistical analysis. One is not able to see the
reduction in lawyer work hours predicted by a policy of shorter time
to discovery cutoff in the bivariate tables, however, because the districts
and the cases from those districts differ on factors other than the
median time to discovery cutoff. Our multivariate analyses adjust for
those other factors, and the bivariate Table 3.4 does not.
discovery cutoff for each case was not used in this analysis because of potential bias in the
multivariate regression results due to missing case descriptors that are correlated with discovery
cutoff time for the case.
73 See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app. tbl. A.7.
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G. Summary of Effects on Lawyer Work Hours
In our main evaluation report, our analyses for total lawyer work
hours showed that cases with early management tended to require
greater work hours and cases from districts with shorter median dis-
covery cutoff tended to require fewer hours. There were no other
clearly consistent policy variable effects on lawyer work hours per party
represented. Thus, of all the policy variables we investigated as possible
predictors of reduced lawyer work hours, only judicial management of
discovery seemed to produce the desired effect.
We found that several attorney and case characteristics were im-
portant predictors of lawyer work hours. These control variables
tended to be far better at explaining variance in lawyer work hours
than did the policy variables. For example, of the total variance ex-
plained by our model, about 95% was explained by the control vari-
ables. This means that lawyer work hours seem to be driven primarily
by factors other than case management policy. Case stakes and case
complexity are the most important predictors of lawyer work hours,
and these two case characteristics alone explained about half of the
variance in our models. In contrast, of the total variance in our time
to disposition models, only about half was explained by the control
variables and the other half was explained by the policy variables.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we found that early management was associated with significantly in-
creased total lawyer work hours if the district did not require discov-
ery/case management plans. Early management was not associated
with significantly increased total lawyer work hours, however, if the
district required discovery/case management plans. This lends strong
support for the continuation of a requirement of discovery/case man-
agement planning. That is, it appears that doing early management
without planning increases lawyer work hours, but early management
coupled with planning does not increase lawyer work hours.
In our current analysis, we also found that mandatory early dis-
closure requirements were not associated with significantly reduced
lawyer work hours. We have explored many different subsets of cases,
including subsets based on stakes, complexity and discovery difficulty.
We found no strong evidence that a policy of early mandatory disclo-
sure reduced lawyer work time on any of the subsets of cases examined.
Attorneys who voluntarily choose to do early disclosure, however, in
districts where such disclosure is voluntary, have significantly lower
work hours. It may be that lower work hours among voluntary disclos-
ing attorneys reflect a type of "choice or selection bias," i.e., attorneys
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on cases for which they voluntarily choose to disclose may be less
contentious attorneys or may be on less contentious cases and hence
spend fewer total work hours on the case, but not necessarily because
of the early disclosure.
We find a significant reduction in total lawyer work hours in
districts with interrogatory limitations. Looking at subsets of cases, the
significant reductions appeared for hourly fee attorneys, defense attor-
neys, contract cases and medium complexity cases. These findings
support the policy of limiting interrogatories as a means of limiting
lawyer work hours because there is no statistical evidence that inter-
rogatory limitations hurt, and they may help for several subsets of
cases.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found that reported total lawyer work hours significantly
increased as the number of district median days to discovery cutoff got
larger. When we looked at subsets of cases, this significant increase
occurred for most subsets, with some exceptions such as low complex-
ity and low discovery difficulty cases (which are unlikely to require as
much time for discovery as more complex or more difficult cases).
In addition to the further analysis that we did on total lawyer work
hours, we also analyzed lawyer work hours on discovery. The policy
implications and findings of statistical significance emerging from our
analysis of lawyer work hours on discovery are very similar to those
from our analysis of total lawyer work hours."
H. Summary of Effects on Time to Disposition
In our main evaluation report, we found four policies that showed
consistent statistically significant effects on time to disposition: (1)
early judicial management, (2) setting the trial schedule early, (3)
reducing discovery cutoff (median days to discovery cutoff in a dis-
trict), and (4) having litigants at or available on the telephone for
settlement conferences. Other policies and procedures we studied
either were not statistically significant or not consistently significant.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found a statistically significant reduction in time to disposi-
tion from early management without setting a trial schedule early, and
a significantly larger reduction from early management that included
setting a trial schedule early. We considered those two early manage-
74 For details of our statistical analysis of total lawyer work hours and lawyer work hours on
discovery, see KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 43, app.
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ment and trial scheduling policies used both with and without a dis-
covery plan requirement, and the results were statistically significant.
There was little difference in time to disposition with or without a
discovery plan if a trial was scheduled early, but cases closed earlier if
discovery planning took place in the absence of an early trial schedule.
Thus, our analysis suggests that the requirement of a discovery/case
management plan is beneficial in reducing time to disposition, espe-
cially if a trial schedule is not set early.
Our statistical analysis of subsets of cases does not lead to any
suggestions for focusing these management policies only on certain
types of cases. Our statistical results are consistent for most subsets of
cases analyzed, although the top 25% most costly cases appear to
benefit especially from the early setting of a trial schedule (early man-
agement of those top 25% of the costly cases without a trial date
scheduled did not significantly reduce their time to disposition). And
cases that are high in complexity, high in discovery difficulty, or high
in stakes appear to benefit especially from the use of discovery/case
management plans.
Early mandatory disclosure again was not statistically significant,
and limiting interrogatories was not consistently significant in predict-
ing reduced time to disposition. 75
1. Summary of Effects on Attorney Satisfaction
In our main evaluation report, we found that the policies that had
the greatest effects on time to disposition and lawyer work hours—i.e.,
early management, median days to discovery cutoff and setting a trial
schedule early in the case—had no statistically significant effect on
lawyer satisfaction. Attorneys with cases where early disclosure occurs
reported significantly greater satisfaction. However, attorneys from dis-
tricts with a policy of requiring mandatory early disclosure were sig-
nificantly less likely to report satisfaction with case management. Dis-
tricts with policies of limiting interrogatories had attorneys who were
significantly more satisfied, but the district median time to discovery
cutoff did not significantly affect attorney satisfaction.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we again found no statistically significant effect on lawyer satisfaction
from early management, setting a trial schedule early in the case and
requiring a discovery plan. We considered those three policies used in
75 For details of our statistical analysis of time to disposition, see KAKALIK ET AL., supra note
43, app.
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various combinations and did not find any significant difference in
satisfaction, although as noted previously, some of those policies do
significantly affect time to disposition and lawyer work hours.
Our current analysis of early disclosure found that attorneys in
districts with a mandatory disclosure policy were less satisfied, but their
level of. satisfaction was not significantly different from the level of
satisfaction for attorneys who did not do early disclosure in voluntary
disclosure districts. Attorneys who voluntarily chose to do early disclo-
sure, however, in districts where such disclosure was voluntary, were
significantly more satisfied. Since most districts had a voluntary disclo-
sure policy at the time of the study, this explains the overall finding
in our main evaluation report that disclosing attorneys were more
satisfied. It may be that greater satisfaction among voluntary disclosing
attorneys reflects a type of "choice or selection bias," i.e., attorneys on
cases for which they voluntarily choose to disclose may be less conten-
tious attorneys or may be on less contentious cases and hence more
satisfied, but not necessarily because of the early disclosure.
Districts with policies of limiting interrogatories again had attor-
neys who were significantly more satisfied, but the district median time
to discovery cutoff still did not affect significantly attorney satisfaction
even when subsets of cases were analyzed.76
J. Summary of Effects on Attorney Views on Fairness
In our main evaluation report, we found no consistent statistically
significant effects of judicial case management on attorney views on
fairness.
In our current analysis of judicial discovery management policies,
we found no statistically significant effects for any of the policy vari-
ables on attorney views on fairness.
A very high percentage of attorneys, about 90%, reported that
case management was fair. There is little variability in our data and it
is not surprising that we do not find statistically significant effects of
judicial case management on attorney views on fairness."
76 For details of our statistical analysis of attorney satisfaction with judicial case management,
see KAKALut ET AL., SUpro note 43, app.
77 For details of our statistical analysis of attorney views on fairness, see KAKALIK ET AL., supra
note 43, app.
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Table 3.1
Information by Type of Early Management and Discovery Plan
Policy: 1992-93 Sample, General Civil Cases with Issue Joined,
Closed with Time to Disposition over 270 Days, and with Lawyer
Work Hours Reported
Type of Early Management and Discovery Plan Policy
Early	 Early	 Early	 Early
Manage, Manage, Manage,
	 Manage,
with Early with Early without	 without
Trial Set, Trial Set, Early Trial Early Trial
with	 without	 Set, with Set, without Not
Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory Early
Variable	 Plan Policy Plan Policy Plan Policy Plan Policy Manage
Median days to	 448	 398	 465	 480	 525
disposition
% lawyers	 75	 69	 71	 73	 75
satisfied with
management
% lawyers view	 88	 89	 85	 88	 90
management
as fair
Median total	 80	 100	 75	 95	 60
lawyer work
hours per
litigant
% with zero	 3	 8	 13	 15	 22
discovery
work hours
Median lawyer	 20	 30	 15	 25	 10
work hours
on discovery
per litigant
Median	 31	 30	 25	 29	 20
percent
discovery
hours of
total lawyer
work hours
Significant
Difference for
Policy Shown
in Multivariate
Analysis?
Significantly
faster
No
No
Significantly
more hours if
no planning
Significantly
more hours if
no planning
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 3.2
Information by Early Disclosure Policy: 1992-93 Sample, General
Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to Disposition
over 270 Days, and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Type of Early Disclosure Policy
Variable
Mandatory
and
Disclosure
Was Made
Mandatory
and
Disclosure
Was Not
Made
Not
Not	 Mandatory
Mandatory	 and
and Disclosure
Disclosure Was Not
Was Made Made
Significant
Difference for
Policy Shown in
Multivariate
Analysis?
447	 477	 455	 482 NoMedian days to
disposition
% lawyers
satisfied with
management
% lawyers view	 87
management
as fair
Median total	 100
lawyer work
hours per
litigant
% with zero	 10
discovery work
hours
Median lawyer	 28
work hours on
discovery per
litigant
Median percent	 29
discovery hours
of total lawyer
work hours
15	 16	 16
25	 25	 27
75	 73	 80	 Not if mandatory,
but significantly
less hours if
voluntarily disclose
71	 63	 81	 70	 Not if mandatory,
but significantly
more satisfied if
voluntarily disclose
88	 93	 85	 No
19	 15	 23	 Not if mandatory,
but significantly
less hours if
voluntarily disclose
% of disclosures	 50	 57
that were full
rather than
pro forma
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 3.3
Information by Interrogatory Limit Policy: 1992-93 Sample,
General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed with Time to
Disposition over 270 Days, and with Lawyer Work Hours Reported
Type of Interrogatory Litnitation Policy	 SignificantDifference for
District Policy	 No	 Policy Shown in
to Limit	 Interrogatory	 Multivariate
Variable
	 Interrogatories	 Limit Policy
	
Analysis?
Median days to disposition
	 468	 455	 No
% lawyers satisfied with 	 74	 68	 Significantly
management
	 more satisfied
% lawyers view management 	 89	 88	 No
as fair
Median total lawyer work 	 80	 66	 Significantly
hours per litigant
	 less hours (not
able to see in
this bivariate
table)
% with zero discovery	 14	 19
work hours
Median lawyer work hours
	 20	 15	 Significantly
on discovery per litigant 	 less hours (not
able to see in
this bivariate
table)
Median percent discovery
	 26	 25
hours of total lawyer
work hours
Note: Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due to rounding and missing data.
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Table 3.4
Information by Shorter and Longer Time to Discovery Cutoff:
1992-93 Sample, General Civil Cases with Issue Joined, Closed
with Time to Disposition over 270 Days, and with Lawyer Work
Hours Reported
Category of District
Variable
Districts with	 Districts with
Shorter Median	 Longer Median Significant Difference
Time to Discovery Time to Discovery for Policy Shown in
Cutoff	 Cutoff	 Multivariate Analysis?
Median days to discovery	 83-177	 178-217
cutoff in 10 districts
Median days to	 455	 473	 Shorter cutoff is
disposition	 significantly faster
% lawyers satisfied with	 68	 78	 No
management
% lawyers view	 87	 90	 No
management as fair
Median total lawyer work 	 83	 75	 Shorter cutoff has
hours per litigant	 significantly less hours
(not able to see in
this hivariate table)
% with zero discovery	 14	 15
work hours
Median lawyer work hours	 25	 16	 Shorter cutoff has
on discovery per	 significantly less hours
litigant	 (not able to sec in
this hivariate table)
Median percent discovery	 28	 25
hours of total lawyer
work hours
Note: Days to discovery cutoff in district means days from first schedule to first discovery
cutoff, without consideration of continuances. Percentages in rows may not add to 100 due
to rounding and missing data
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IV. POLICY FINDINGS
When judges were asked their opinions about discovery manage-
ment on the cases in our 1992-93 sample, the vast majority responded
that such management was generally desirable (96% in favor of setting
discovery limits; 89% in favor of requiring early disclosure; and 98%
in favor of good-faith efforts before filing discovery motions).
When lawyers were asked their opinions on discovery manage-
ment on those same cases, a majority responded that such manage-
ment was generally desirable (86% in favor of setting discovery limits;
71% in favor of requiring early disclosure; and 96% in favor of good-
faith efforts before filing discovery motions).
Given that judges and lawyers are generally favorably inclined
toward judicial management of discovery, and given that discovery is
often cited in anecdotes as being a problem leading to excessive cost
and delay, we analyzed the efficacy of various discovery management
policies in reducing lawyer work hours and time to disposition.
A. Findings on Early Case Management and Discovery Planning
Our multivariate statistical analysis supports the policy of early
management and early scheduling of a trial date as a means of reduc-
ing time to disposition. Our current analysis also supports the require-
ment of discovery/case management plans as a means of reducing the
time to disposition, limiting lawyer work hours, and thereby limiting
the costs of litigation in cases that are managed early.
Early management without setting a trial schedule early predicts
a statistically significant reduction in time to disposition, and early
management that includes setting a trial schedule early predicts a
significantly larger reduction. We considered those two early manage-
ment and trial scheduling policies used both with and without a dis-
covery plan requirement, and the results were statistically significant.
There was little difference in time to disposition with or without a
discovery plan if a trial was scheduled early, but cases closed sig-
nificantly earlier if discovery planning took place in the absence of an
early trial schedule. Thus, our analysis suggests that the requirement
of a discovery/case management plan is beneficial in reducing time to
disposition, especially if a trial schedule is not set early.
Our statistical analysis of subsets of cases does not lead to any
suggestions for focusing these management policies only on certain
types of cases. Our statistical results are consistent for most subsets of
cases analyzed, although the top 25% most costly cases 78 appear to
"These cases had total lawyer work hours per litigant of more than 188.
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benefit especially from the early setting of a trial schedule (early man-
agement of those top 25% of the costly cases without a trial date
scheduled did not significantly reduce their time to disposition). And
cases that are high in complexity, high in discovery difficulty, or high
in stakes appear to benefit especially from the use of discovery/case
management plans.
In our analysis of judicial discovery management policies, we find
that early management is associated with significantly higher total
lawyer work hours if the district does not require discovery/case man-
agement plans. Early management is not associated with significantly
higher total lawyer work hours, however, if the district requires discov-
ery/case management plans, and this lends strong support for the
continuation of a requirement of discovery/case management plan-
ning. That is, it appears that doing early management without plan-
ning increases lawyer work hours, but early management coupled with
planning does not increase lawyer work hours.
Our interviews suggested reasons why early management may
increase lawyer work hours. Lawyers need to respond to a court's
management—for example, by talking to the litigant and to the other
lawyers in advance of a conference with the judge, by traveling, and by
spending time waiting at the courthouse, meeting with the judge and
updating the file after the conference. In addition, once judicial case
management has begun a discovery cutoff date has usually been estab-
lished, and attorneys may feel an obligation to begin discovery. Doing
so could shorten time to disposition, but it may also increase lawyer
work hours on cases that were about to settle when the judge began
early management. The CJRA data indicate that cases that are man-
aged early have a higher likelihood of having lawyer hours spent on
discovery. When a district requires discovery/case management plans,
however, the increase in lawyer work hours associated with early man-
agement appears to be offset by benefits associated with the required
planning, and the net effect is no significant increase in lawyer work
hours. There are at least two plausible explanations for this outcome.
First, the planning itself may produce the benefit. The requirement
that the lawyers jointly meet and prepare a discovery/case manage-
ment plan for submission to the court may result in more efficient
litigation with less lawyer work hours. Another plausible explanation is
that the judges in districts that, require plans may also manage cases
differently and better (in ways that we did not measure) than judges
in districts that do not require plans.
When we looked at various subsets of cases, we found no strong
evidence that the effects of early management and discovery planning
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were systematically concentrated on certain types of cases based on
level of complexity, level, of discovery difficulty, plaintiff or defendant
side of the case, contingent or hourly fee lawyer, size of the law organi-
zation in which the lawyer worked, case stakes, tort or contract or other
nature of suit categories, or the top 25% most costly cases among
general civil litigation that has time to disposition over 270 days after
filing.
We find no statistically significant effect on lawyer satisfaction or
views on fairness from early management, setting a trial schedule early
in the case and requiring a discovery plan.
B. Findings on Early Disclosure
Our data and analyses do not support strongly the policy of man-
datory early disclosure as a means of significantly reducing lawyer work
hours and thereby reducing the costs of litigation, or as a means of
reducing time to disposition. We find that cases in districts with some
type of mandatory disclosure policy had lawyer work hours and time to
disposition that are not significantly different from cases in districts
without any type of mandatory disclosure policy. Regardless of whether
or not early disclosure actually occurs, cases from districts with man-
datory early disclosure policies tend to have similar estimated lawyer
work hours as cases from districts without a mandatory disclosure
policy that had no early disclosure.
Some people suggested that if we had looked at subsets of cases,
such as those that were more or less complex or had more or less
difficulty with discovery, we might have found a subset of cases for
which this policy was effective. We now have explored many different
subsets of cases, including subsets based on stakes, complexity and
discovery difficulty. We found no strong evidence that a policy of early
mandatory disclosure reduced lawyer work time or time to disposition
on any of the subsets of cases examined. Attorneys who voluntarily
choose to do early disclosure, however, in districts where such disclo-
sure is voluntary, have significantly lower work hours. It may be that
lower work hours among voluntary disclosing attorneys reflects a type
of "choice or selection bias," i.e., attorneys on cases for which they
voluntarily choose to disclose may be less contentious attorneys or may
be on less contentious cases and hence spend fewer total work hours
on the case, but not necessarily because of the early disclosure. If the
early disclosure is effective in reducing lawyer work time, then we
would have expected to see some evidence of the effect on mandatory
disclosure cases, not just . on cases with voluntary disclosure.
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It should be noted, however, that in our main evaluation report
we found that attorney work hours were significantly lower for the
three districts that had a particular type of mandatory disclosure: early
mandatory disclosure of information bearing on both sides of the dispute.
With only three districts using this particular type of mandatory disclo-
sure policy, however, it is difficult to generalize this statistical finding.
We also note that we could not evaluate the mandatory disclosure
prescribed under the December 1993 amendments to Rule 26(a) (1)
because our sample of cases was selected well before that amendment
took effect, and none of our study districts had a mandatory disclosure
policy that was exactly the same as the amended Rule 26(a) (1) when
our sample cases were selected. Hence, the "empirical" story of the
effects of Rule 26(a) (1) remains to be told.
RAND's lawyer surveys indicate that when early disclosure was
made for cases in the 1992-93 sample, it was "full disclosure" 57% of
the time, and "pro forma" disclosure 43% of the time. For general civil
cases with issue joined, lawyers report more disclosure when it is man-
datory (60% of the cases in mandatory disclosure districts versus 45%
in voluntary disclosure districts and 40% in districts with no disclosure
policy). Part of the problem with a mandatory early disclosure require-
ment is compliance; lawyers report that when disclosure is done on a
mandatory basis, it is full disclosure for 50% of the cases and pro forma
disclosure for the remaining half of the cases.
Findings from a recent survey of about 1000 attorneys by the
ABA's Litigation Section were similar to ours:
Analysis of the survey results suggests that Rule 26(a) (1)
disclosure has not had a significant impact on federal civil
litigation. To the extent that it has had any measurable effects,
most are negative. The survey provided no evidence that, at
the one year mark, disclosure had reduced discovery costs or
delays. Nor do the responses suggest that disclosure has re-
duced conflict between adversaries during the discovery proc-
ess. Consequently, during its first year of implementation,
disclosure has not resulted in the systemic improvements for
which its proponents had hoped. 79
KATIIILEEN L. litANER. ET AL., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE SUR-
VEY: FEDERAL RULE 26(A) (1) AFTER ONE YEAR 1 (1996). The PA(E) advisory group also con-
ducted a survey of about 4000 lawyers regarding the early mandatory disclosure procedures in
that district, with results that were very similar to ours. This district's procedures stay discovery
until both sides have completed mandatory disclosure of information likely to "bear significantly
on the claims and defenses," plus other items such as names of individuals with information and
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C. Findings on Good-Faith Efforts To Resolve Discovery Disputes
Our multivariate statistical analysis found no significant relation-
ship between any of the variables studied and reported good-faith
effort to resolve discovery disputes before filing a motion.
D. Findings on Limiting Interrogatories
Our multivariate statistical analysis supports the policy of limiting
interrogatories as a means of significantly limiting lawyer work hours
and thereby reducing the costs of litigation. There is no statistical
evidence that interrogatory limitations hurt, and they appear to help
significantly for several subsets of cases.
E. Findings on Shortening Discovery Cutoff Time
Our multivariate statistical analysis supports the policy of shorter
times to discovery cutoff as means of significantly limiting lawyer work
hours and thereby reducing the costs of litigation, and as a means of
reducing the time to case disposition. When we looked at subsets of
any insurance, Of the 1000 plus attorneys responding, over 60% felt that some rule mandating
self-executing disclosure should remain in effect. Judges were 85% in favor of such disclosure.
When asked about compliance, over 90% of lawyers said they themselves had complied more
than minimally, and that over two-thirds of their opponents had complied more than minimally.
See ROBERT M. LANDIS ET AL., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 5-6, app. A at 12 (1996).
The NY(E) advisory group also surveyed lawyers regarding early mandatory disclosure for
cases filed after the plan was adopted. See EDWIN J. WESELY ET AL., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
ADVISORY GROUP, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AnvisoRY GROUP TO TIIE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TO THE HONORABLE THOMAS C. PLATT, CHIEF JUDGE 5-6 (1994).
Their annual report indicated:
The survey results at this stage are neither a ringing endorsement, nor a condem-
nation, of mandatory disclosure. About half the respondents said that mandatory
disclosure improved pretrial discovery, and about half said that there was no
change. A majority also said that mandatory disclosure had made either no contri-
bution or a slight contribution to easing the problems of undue cost and unneces-
sary delay. On the other hand, an overwhelming majority said that mandatory
disclosure had no negative effects on pretrial discovery .. . A majority (55%)
would make mandatory disclosure a permanent part of the local rules, and an
additional 23% would make mandatory disclosure a permanent part of the local
rules if modifications were made,
It appears fi-om these data that the parade of horribles predicted by some critics
of mandatory disclosure has not come to pass. On the other hand, it is not clear
the extent to which mandatory disclosure has improved the operation of pretrial
discovery, if at all. The vast majority of respondents have had little experience with
mandatory disclosure.
Id.
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cases, these significant decreases in lawyer work hours and time to
disposition occurred for most subsets, with some exceptions such as
low complexity and low discovery difficulty cases (which are unlikely
to require as much time for discovery as more complex or more
difficult cases).
F. Interpreting Effects and Generalizing to Other Cases, Judges and
Districts
Although the predicted effects discussed in this document serve
as a useful gauge of our statistical model estimates, they might present
the temptation to interpret them as the exact size of a causal effect.
That is, one might incorrectly treat these estimates as if expanding the
use of a particular case management procedure will reduce time to
disposition or lawyer work hours a certain amount for each and every
new case that receives the management. This almost assuredly will not
happen in exactly the same way.
There are reasons why our observed effect might not generalize
in exactly the same way to other cases, judges, or districts.
One reason is that the cases in our data that receive the policies
might be different from those that do not receive the policies in some
way not accurately measured by our control variables. Despite the fact
that we have more and better data than have been available to previous
studies, and that we have been as careful as possible in constructing
our many models, one must still interpret the results carefully.
We believe that we have provided a reasonable estimate of the
effects of policy for the cases, judges and districts we observed in our
data. It is much more difficult to determine the effect of the policy if
implemented on different cases or by different judges in the same or
different districts.
Judges who choose to implement policies and management pro-
cedures often do so at their discretion. These judges may differ from
other judges in their basic approach to case management or because
of personality. These differences between judges could affect the im-
plementation of policy, and this could change the policy's effect. For
example, if enthusiastic managerial judges currently set trial schedules
early and also work hard on settlement and this leads to early closure,
then having less enthusiastic nonmanagerial judges setting trial sched-
ules early may not have the same effect that we observed.
Similarly, districts that choose to implement policies and proce-
dures do so because of the characteristics of the district and the judicial
officers. Because policies were not assigned to cases at random in our
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data, we cannot fully untangle the relationship between district char-
acteristics and the use of policies. Hence, it is hard to determine exactly
how the policies will affect time to disposition or lawyer work hours if
implemented on a wider scale.
We stress that statistical models do not show cause and effect.
Causation must be interpreted in light of understanding how the
underlying civil justice system that generated the data operates.
Given our understanding of how the civil justice system operates,
we believe that the policies we identified as important predictors of
shorter time to disposition or lower lawyer work hours are likely to
reduce time and work hours if implemented, but that our estimated
effect should be treated as an upper bound to the effects that would
occur if the policies were implemented in all districts by all judges for
all cases.
We stress that there is a difference between adopting a policy at
the district level and implementation in practice at the case level. For
policy to have an effect on time to disposition or lawyer work hours, it
must not just be adopted "on paper" but also must be implemented in
practice at the case level. Using our attorney-level data, we have esti-
mated the effect conditional on a policy or procedure actually being
implemented.
G. General Policy Implication
Overall, lawyer work hours per litigant on discovery are zero for
38% of general civil cases, and low for the majority of cases. Discovery
is not a pervasive litigation cost problem for the majority of cases. The
empirical data show that any problems that may exist with discovery
are concentrated in a minority of the cases, and the evidence indicates
that discovery costs can be very high in some cases. Subjective infor-
mation from our interviews with lawyers also suggests that the median
or typical case is not "the problem." It is the minority of the cases with
very high discovery costs that is the problem, and that generates the
anecdotal parade of horribles that dominates much of the debate over
discovery rules and discovery case management.
These findings suggest that policymakers consider focusing discov-
ery rule changes and discovery management on the types of cases likely
to have high discovery costs, and the discovery practices that are likely
to generate those high costs. More attention is clearly needed on how
to identify those high discovery cost cases early in their life, and how
best to manage discovery on those cases.
